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ABSTRACT 
  Courts, lawyers, and scholars have long assumed that The 
Federalist Papers supply important information for use in 
constitutional argument and interpretation. In recent years, 
commentators have questioned this view. Their skepticism grows out 
of two major concerns. First, Justice Scalia’s challenge to the use of 
legislative history in the statutory context casts a cloud over judicial 
use of background texts such as The Federalist in seeking the 
meaning of the Constitution. Second, even if courts may rely on some 
background materials in interpreting the Constitution, there is reason 
to conclude that The Federalist does not qualify as the sort of 
material that provides useful guidance. The basic difficulty is that the 
authors of The Federalist wrote their essays as advocacy documents 
for publication in local newspapers, rather than as scholarly texts 
designed to lay out in neutral fashion the purposes and terms of the 
Constitution. Building on this historical reality, analysts have properly 
asked why courts should view a series of editorials, churned out to 
help win a heated political battle, as a key modern-day source of 
constitutional interpretation. 
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  This Article explores the proper role of The Federalist in the 
search for constitutional meaning. It demonstrates that the essays were 
in fact sophisticated advocacy documents that wove together different 
styles of rhetoric designed to win over readers to the cause of 
ratification. This reality requires courts to approach the papers with a 
measure of caution. At the same time, the Article rejects the view that 
the campaign-literature purpose of The Federalist disqualifies it from 
serving as an important touchstone of constitutional interpretation. 
This is the case primarily because the authors of The Federalist, in 
conceiving and structuring their argument, focused on making a 
highly rational and highly comprehensive appeal to a broad and 
diverse audience. Against this backdrop, The Federalist should be 
viewed as setting forth something akin to a consensus understanding 
of the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federalist stands, head and shoulders above all else, as the 
most significant book in the history of American law and political 
theory. Authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay, The Federalist contains eighty-five essays on the origins, 
purposes, and teachings of the Constitution. The essays range across 
every major subject of constitutional interpretation: the separation of 
powers, federalism, the judicial role, republicanism, the proper scope 
of the congressional powers, the roots of legitimate government, the 
functions of the president, and the nature of rights.1
The importance of The Federalist cannot be overstated. 
Throughout American history it has provided a pivot point of 
argument in great struggles over constitutional meaning. Hamilton 
and Madison themselves drew on The Federalist in debates over the 
constitutionality of the National Bank Act and other early assertions 
of federal authority.2 In the years leading up to the Civil War, 
Southern nullificationists and Northern unionists both invoked the 
essays,3 and modern-day proponents and opponents of sweeping 
executive powers have done so as well.4 In scores of cases, and with 
much-increased frequency in recent decades, the Supreme Court has 
drawn on The Federalist in resolving hard-fought battles over what 
the Constitution means for disputants in the context of federal 
litigation.5 The essays are also the stuff of high political drama. In the 
 1. For an extensive examination of The Federalist’s treatment of these subjects, see 
generally Dan T. Coenen, The Story of The Federalist: How Hamilton and Madison 
Reconceived America (April 21, 2006) (unpublished book manuscript, on file with the author). 
 2. Hamilton, for instance, quoted from Madison’s The Federalist No. 44 in arguing that 
the bank bill was constitutional. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 321 (1971). Madison, in 
turn, quoted from Hamilton’s treatment of the executive in The Federalist in challenging 
Hamilton’s support for the president’s unilateral issuance of a proclamation of neutrality. Id. at 
346–47. 
 3. See Jack N. Rakove, Early Uses of The Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 234, 
239 (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987) (“During the debate over the admission to the Union of 
Maine and Missouri, eight out of nine speakers who cited The Federalist did so while justifying 
the right of states to determine the propriety of slavery.”). 
 4. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (citing The Federalist No. 70 as 
supporting the president’s authority in the area of national security); id. at 30 (citing The 
Federalist No. 64 for the president’s authority to undertake intelligence activities without 
congressional approval). 
 5. See Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1324, 1329 (1998) (documenting the Supreme Court’s common and increasing use of The 
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broadly publicized hearings on the appointments of John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, for example, participants alluded 
to The Federalist on no fewer than eleven occasions.6
Against this backdrop, Americans often assume that the authors 
of The Federalist prepared their famous text as a legal treatise or as a 
scholarly recapitulation on how the Constitution came to be. This 
view is wrong. In fact, the authors first published their essays in New 
York newspapers while citizens of that state struggled with whether 
to support or oppose the proposed Constitution.7 More particularly, 
the Federalist essays responded to a torrent of tracts published by 
Constitution-opposing editorial writers who were at work in a key 
state where a majority of voters appeared to lean against ratification.8
In short, The Federalist was an advocacy document, perhaps even 
“propaganda.”9 Either way, the essential purpose of the essays was to 
set forth an argument. That argument, in turn, was designed to 
maintain the loyalties of existing federalists while bringing undecided 
and unsympathetic voters over to the proratification cause. 
Recognizing this essential function of The Federalist raises two basic, 
but little-explored, questions: First, just how did the essays’ authors 
seek to persuade the essays’ readers? Second, how does the nature of 
the argument of The Federalist bear on judicial use of the essays in 
the modern day? In this article, I seek to offer answers to these 
questions. 
In Part I, I set the stage for further inquiry by sketching the 
historical context in which the essays were written. Because the 
purpose of The Federalist was to persuade citizens to elect ratification 
convention delegates who would support the Constitution, the 
Federalist in recent years); Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Jennifer Miller, The Supreme Court and 
The Federalist: A Supplement, 1996–2001, 90 KY. L.J. 415, 420–40 (2001) (tabulating references 
to The Federalist in Supreme Court opinions). 
 6. See Transcripts: The Roberts Confirmation Hearings, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/09/14/LI2005091402149.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (statements 
of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Sen. John Cornyn, Judge John Roberts, and Sen. Tom Coburn); Campaign 
for the Supreme Court: The Politics of the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., http://blogs. 
washingtonpost.com/campaignforthecourt/2006/01/hearing_transcr.html (last visited Oct. 18, 
2006) (statements of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
 8. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 262 (2004) (noting that the antifederalist 
delegation elected to the New York ratification convention was over twice as large as that of the 
federalists). 
 9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 
(1980). 
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immediate circumstances in which those citizens found themselves 
were of extreme importance to Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. Part I 
thus directs attention to key background facts of the time, including 
the already-demonstrated shortcomings of the Articles of 
Confederation, mounting frustrations with interstate trade conflicts, 
and rising fears brought on by growing debtor militancy, evidenced 
most pointedly by the Massachusetts uprising known as Shays’s 
Rebellion. 
Building on Part I, I set forth in Part II a typology of the 
rhetorical techniques used by the authors of The Federalist. I created 
this typology by employing a three-step process. First, I extracted all 
significant lines of argument presented in each of the eighty-five 
essays on all of the many subjects of controversy of the time (for 
example, the need for a strengthened union to enhance military 
capabilities and commercial prosperity, the appropriateness of two-
year terms for House members and six-year terms for senators, the 
legitimacy of judicial review, etc.). Second, I sought to identify the 
different styles of argument that cut across The Federalist’s treatment 
of these topics. Finally, I characterized and contrasted these styles, 
double-checking along the way to see that each subject-matter 
argument I had identified fell into at least one rhetorical category. 
In the end, I conclude that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay utilized 
six major tools of argument. They made appeals to (1) the particular 
circumstances of their audience; (2) the lessons of history; (3) 
practical reasoning; (4) imagery and metaphor; (5) the need for 
compromise; and (6) emotional responses, including responses 
inspired by America’s revolutionary experience. Other observers 
might well group the rhetorical tools of The Federalist in other ways. 
The key point to glean from this exercise, however, does not depend 
on precisely how the process of counting and characterizing is done. 
The key point is that—however that process might be fine-tuned—the 
argumentative strategy of The Federalist was nuanced and complex. 
In Part III of the article, I explore the implications of Part II. In 
particular, I address the question whether courts may legitimately use 
The Federalist as a tool of modern-day constitutional interpretation. 
Answering this question proves difficult because others have 
advanced a host of different theories as to why judicial use of the 
essays makes sense. I seek to show that the argumentative style of the 
essays creates difficulties for each of these theories, especially 
theories based on the utility of The Federalist as legislative history, as 
a dictionary-like guide to eighteenth-century word meanings, or as a 
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learned legal treatise. The argumentative style of the essays, however, 
supports the case for citing The Federalist in one important way. 
Because the Papers’ authors sought to build wide support for the 
Constitution through careful appeals to reason, there is cause to view 
their work as approaching a consensus understanding. 
I.  THE CONTEXT SURROUNDING THE FEDERALIST 
On September 17, 1787, the members of the Constitutional 
Convention gathered for their last meeting in Philadelphia’s 
Independence Hall. After months of toil that had demanded 
compromise by every delegate, these statesmen prepared to sign a 
charter of government like none that had ever existed before. There 
was cause for celebration, and a sense of accomplishment filled the 
chamber. Doubts for the future, however, mixed with the thrill of the 
moment. 
Worries stemmed from the Constitution itself. In the document’s 
final article, the framers specified that the states should hold special 
ratification conventions to consider whether to approve the 
Constitution and thereby bring it into effect.10 Nobody could predict 
what would happen at those conventions, but everyone could see 
storm clouds on the horizon. Most ominously, as the Convention 
closed, the delegations of the two most populous states, Virginia and 
Massachusetts, found themselves sharply divided.11 Edmund 
Randolph, joined in dissent by fellow Virginian George Mason, took 
the floor to predict that “[n]ine States will fail to ratify the plan.”12 
Elbridge Gerry, one of three Massachusetts delegates, likewise 
refused to sign the charter, predicting that in his state the 
Constitution might well contribute to the “calamitous event” of “a 
Civil war.”13
The news from New York was even less encouraging. That state 
had sent three delegates to Philadelphia—John Lansing, Jr., Robert 
Yates, and Alexander Hamilton. In July, however, the states-rights-
 10. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 11. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 648–49 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (“The Constitution being signed by all the members except Mr. Randolph [of 
Virginia], Mr. Mason [of Virginia], and Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] who declined to give it the 
sanction of their names.”). 
 12. Id. at 645–46; see also id. at 631 (setting forth a plan for inviting amendments from state 
delegations and then holding a second convention in anticipation of failed ratification). 
 13. Id. at 647. 
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minded Lansing and Yates abandoned the Convention altogether, 
stripping New York of even a quorum entitled to vote and leaving 
Hamilton as the state’s sole signatory of the final constitutional 
proposal.14 By its terms, the Constitution would come into effect upon 
ratification by nine states. Everyone knew, however, that the new 
nation stood little chance of success without the strategically situated 
state of New York, and it stood no chance at all if Virginia or 
Massachusetts abandoned the enterprise as well.15
Things would soon get worse for supporters of the Constitution. 
As the document circulated through the former colonies, prominent 
critics stepped forward in large numbers. Dissenters included famous 
patriots, such as Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, as 
well as influential local leaders, such as Luther Martin of Maryland 
and James Winthrop of Massachusetts.16 Opponents of the 
Constitution, who became known as “antifederalists,”17 moved swiftly 
to block ratification. Scores of essayists, using names like “Cato,” “A 
Plebeian,” and “Centinel,” directed an avalanche of criticisms at the 
proposed Constitution almost as soon as it was made public by the 
Philadelphia conventioneers.18
 14. Signature by just one of New York’s three delegates meant that the state did not 
officially join in the act of promulgating the Constitution, a fact in some tension with assertions 
later made in The Federalist that “all the deputations composing the Convention . . . were 
induced to accede . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 239 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 15. See, e.g., Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at vii, viii–ix (Buccaneer Books 
1992) (noting that a successful government would require participation by Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and that “New York was the most difficult case with the 
strongest opposition”); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 250 (2d ed. 2005) (finding that “the new government would have 
little prospect of succeeding” without the “large, powerful, and centrally located states” of New 
York and Virginia); JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783–1789, 
at 340 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1888) (arguing that “the Union could never be cemented 
without” New York). 
 16. Martin, who was Maryland’s attorney general at the time, had previously been a 
member of the Confederation Congress and the Philadelphia Convention, which he had left in 
disgust before its completion. Gregory Stiverson, Maryland: Necessity, the Mother of Union, in 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES 131, 145 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 
1988). Winthrop took the lead in opposing the Constitution in Massachusetts, including by 
writing critiques under the pen name “Agrippa.” RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE 
CREATION 225 (1985). 
 17. See, e.g., LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR 170 (1966). 
 18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 263 (noting that 
“publications . . . have swarmed against the Convention”). See generally 2–6 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (collecting antifederalist tracts). 
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The chances for ratification in New York looked especially 
bleak. Prominent antifederalists such as Melancton Smith trumpeted 
objections to the charter; Lansing and Yates soon joined the chorus;19 
and the local essayist “Brutus” (believed by many to have been Yates 
himself20) leveled trenchant attacks against the Constitution. These 
critics had much material to work with, especially in appealing to 
residents of a state that had weathered recent economic distresses far 
better than most of the other former colonies. That the Empire State, 
with a population of over 300,000, was given no more voice in the 
Senate than Rhode Island, with a population of some 68,000,21 struck 
many New Yorkers as outrageous.22 Some local citizens worried that a 
federal monopoly over import taxes would disadvantage a state that 
had long leveraged its famous port to impose duties borne in large 
part by nonresident buyers and sellers.23 Still other New Yorkers 
feared that a strengthened federal Congress would reject land claims 
made by the state with regard to the disputed territory of Vermont.24 
Most important of all, the state’s leading political figure, Governor 
 19. See John P. Kaminski, New York: Adjusting to Circumstances, in THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE STATES 225, 234–35 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) (“Yates and 
Lansing waited a while before publicly declaring their objections to the proposed 
constitution.”). 
 20. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 358. 
 21. The 1790 census reported that New York had a population of 340,120 and Rhode 
Island a population of 68,825. RICHARD L. FORSTALL, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, POPULATION 
OF STATES AND COUNTIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 1790–1990, at 4 (1996). 
 22. See, e.g., Brutus III, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 377, 379 (criticizing as “unreasonable, and unjust” the equality of 
representation between Delaware on the one hand and Massachusetts and Virginia on the 
other). But see id. at 447 n.26 (editorial note) (observing that “[t]he question of the 
apportionment of Senate seats equally among the states was one on which the Anti-Federalists 
were equivocal” and that several antifederalists, including Brutus, seem not to have been 
consistent on this point). 
 23. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 28–29 (1986) (footnote omitted) (noting that “the 
manorial lords of the Hudson valley region . . . took advantage of [their] predominance to shift 
the burden of taxation from the land to imports, and this fact contributed powerfully to [their] 
opposition to the Constitution, because it implied a transference of the weight of taxation for 
state purposes to the soil”); CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 244 (asserting that “[t]he tariff issue 
held special force in New York”). But see DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 174 & n.19 (discussing the 
conflicting views of historians Thomas C. Cochran and Forrest McDonald on whether impost-
related concerns were a significant factor as New Yorkers considered the Constitution). 
 24. See Kaminski, supra note 19, at 228–29 (“The state’s claim to the area known as 
Vermont was disputed” and “delegates warned [Governor] Clinton about the possible attempts 
to seize New York’s northwestern territory”). 
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George Clinton, took up the antifederalist banner.25 Support for the 
Constitution from George Washington, who had served as President 
of the Philadelphia Convention, and Benjamin Franklin, who had sat 
as the Convention’s most senior member, surely counted for 
something. These icons, however, did not hail from New York, where 
the popular Governor Clinton wielded a potent influence. That 
influence was so great that some believed the governor alone would 
determine in the end the outcome of the ratification battle.26
It was into this vortex that Alexander Hamilton chose to throw 
his talents as a theorist, strategist, and writer. Hamilton was an 
archenemy of Governor Clinton,27 an experienced political essayist,28 
and a lawyer steeped in the skills of advocacy.29 He had a 
commitment to the constitutional project matched by few in America, 
 25. See, e.g., JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON 135 (1993) (noting that Clinton at first 
“refused to take a public stand on the new form of government” but that, “[w]ithin a short time, 
the governor’s opposition to the Constitution was widely reported”). 
 26. John P. Kaminski has noted that Clinton was very popular as governor, id. at 9, and 
William L. Stone wrote of the “vast influence” Clinton wielded “in his day,” William L. Stone, 
George Clinton, MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, June 1879, at 329, 354. Indeed, Clinton 
was so popular that he was elected seven times. KAMINSKI, supra note 25, at 2. According to 
federalists, the governor was indeed the focal point of the opposition. Referring to Clinton, one 
observer opined that “‘[t]he Helmsman leads a majority by the nose just as he pleases.’” John P. 
Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR 48, 99 (Stephen L. 
Schechter ed., 1985) (quoting Extract of a letter from New York (July 20, 1788), in NEW 
HAMPSHIRE SPY, July 29, 1788). 
 27. For example, in a piece dated July 21, 1787, anonymously published in the Daily 
Advertiser, Hamilton accused Governor Clinton of undermining the work of the Philadelphia 
Convention. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 237. Hamilton wrote that “such conduct in a man high 
in office, argues greater attachment to his own power than to the public good, and furnishes 
strong reason to suspect a dangerous predetermination to oppose whatever may tend to 
diminish the former, however it may promote the latter.” Alexander Hamilton, N.Y. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, July 21, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 229, 232 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). Not surprisingly, this letter stirred much hostility in the state and 
helped render Hamilton and Clinton lifelong political antagonists. Hamilton’s antipathy for 
Governor Clinton also surfaced in The Federalist. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 518 (asserting that “a great number of very improper 
appointments” had been made by the executive council, which included Governor Clinton; 
noting that “whether he [seeks] the advancement of persons, whose chief merit is their implicit 
devotion to his will” and whether he seeks to advance a “despicable and dangerous system of 
personal influence, are questions which unfortunately for the community can only be the 
subjects of speculation and conjecture”). 
 28. See GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 59 (1981) (noting Hamilton’s early work as 
an essayist, beginning at age eighteen). 
 29. See, e.g., CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 168 (noting that Hamilton’s law manual was “so 
expertly done, its copious information so rigorously pigeonholed, that it was copied by hand and 
circulated among New York law students for years”). 
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and he also had valuable experience in government—as Washington’s 
chief aide in the early years of the Revolution, as a battlefield 
commander later in the war, as a member of the New York legislature 
following the Revolution, and as a representative to the 
Confederation Congress.30 Hamilton’s legendary self-assurance was in 
full flower by 1787, as was his unmatched zeal in battling political 
adversaries of every sort.31 Propelled by these forces, Hamilton took 
the lead in defending the Constitution in his home state. 
The first order of business was to devise a plan. Hamilton would 
do what was expected by meeting with local citizens, by plotting 
federalist tactics, and by seeking one of the 65 seats at his state’s 
ratifying convention.32 The core of his strategy, however, involved a 
project so ambitious that it was not pursued anywhere else in the 
nation. Hamilton would oversee the production of an elaborate series 
of essays, to be published in local newspapers, that made the case for 
ratification.33 In keeping with the fashion of the day, these tracts 
would bear only a pen name, and—in an effort to sound a high-toned 
note of public-spiritedness—Hamilton chose the title “Publius.” 
Hamilton’s next order of business was to find collaborators. New 
York’s most prominent federalist, John Jay, quickly signed onto the 
project. Jay had not served as a delegate to the Philadelphia 
Convention, but he was an ardent supporter of the Constitution and a 
well-versed student of government. Indeed, few Americans—and no 
New Yorkers—could match Jay’s record of federal service.34 He had 
sat as a delegate to both the First and the Second Continental 
Congresses, as President of the wartime federal Congress, and as 
minister to Spain from 1780 to 1782. Along with fellow luminaries 
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, Jay had served on the 
negotiating team that produced the peace treaty that ended the 
Revolutionary War and, as of the time of the writing of The 
 30. See id. at 100–02 (as Washington’s aide); id. at 163–64 (as commander at Yorktown); id. 
at 173 (service in Confederation Congress); id. at 221 (service in New York Assembly). 
 31. See, e.g., id. at 60 (describing the “slashing style of attack” that “would make Hamilton 
the most feared polemicist in America”). 
 32. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 186 (“Alexander Hamilton held a seat from New 
York . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 222 (describing Hamilton as “editorial 
impresario” of the Papers); id. at 246 (reporting that “Hamilton conceived [the] ambitious 
writing project”). 
 34. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 254 (1996) (noting that “Jay was the most 
prominent national official” after 1783). 
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Federalist, he held the Confederation’s most important office as 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In the end, however, Jay would 
contribute little to the project. A severe bout of rheumatism put him 
on the sidelines after he completed only four tracts, and he would 
later find time to pen only one more essay.35
Who would fill the breach created by Jay’s unavailability? 
Gouvernor Morris declined an invitation to participate, and William 
Duer, a New York City federalist who would later write as “Philo-
Publius,” proved incapable of producing work that met Hamilton’s 
exacting standards.36 The great stroke of luck, for Hamilton and for 
the nation, came through a coincidence of scheduling. Following its 
formation in 1781, the hapless federal legislature created by the 
Articles of Confederation had wandered from Philadelphia to 
Princeton to Annapolis to Trenton.37 In the fall and winter of 1787, 
however, the Confederation Congress was meeting in New York 
City.38 This turn of events meant that Virginia representative James 
Madison, fresh from the Constitutional Convention, was near at hand 
as Hamilton contemplated who should help him wield the quill of 
Publius.39
Madison was uniquely well qualified to collaborate on the 
project. Like Hamilton, he was an ardent student of government who 
had served in both his own state’s legislature and the Confederation 
Congress.40 Madison had also played a key role at the Philadelphia 
 35. DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 106–07. 
 36. Id. at 107–08. Duer had previously “served in the Continental Congress” and the 
convention that framed the New York Constitution. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 293. He was 
also an inveterate speculator and a continuing presence in Hamilton’s life. In particular, Duer’s 
later mishandling of joint business dealings would later bring Hamilton great embarrassment 
and Duer himself seven years in debtors’ prison. See id. at 381–88 (Duer “was packed off to 
debtors’ prison” and “Hamilton was appalled to learn of Madison’s allegation that his purchases 
of government securities to steady the market had been made at high prices to benefit 
speculators”). 
 37. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 271 (“[T]he Continental Congress had skipped about from 
Philadelphia to Princeton, to Annapolis, to Trenton, to New York, until it had become a 
laughing-stock . . . .”). 
 38. Congress had been meeting in New York since November 7, 1785. See 23 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at xii (Paul H. Smith ed., 1995) (providing chronology). 
 39. See Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 659, 659 
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987) (asserting that Hamilton brought in Madison 
“ironically, only after several others had declined his invitation”). 
 40. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 158 (calling Madison the “leader of the group anxious 
to continue the reform in the laws of Virginia”); id. at 179 (attributing Madison’s candidacy and 
election to a desire to maintain the credibility of the national government). 
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Convention itself, including by crafting the main features of the so-
called Virginia Plan, which had provided the starting point for 
discussions among the delegates.41 Madison, in contrast to Hamilton, 
had dutifully attended and fruitfully participated in every session of 
the Convention. He had also taken extensive notes of the proceedings 
and written lengthy tracts on constitutional theory even before the 
Convention commenced.42 If Hamilton was a lightning rod of 
controversy, Madison—at least as of 1787—seemed to be a paragon 
of understated brilliance and good will.43 Writing of the Virginian, 
Georgia delegate William Pierce observed: 
[E]very Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. He blends 
together the profound politician, with the Scholar . . . . From a spirit 
of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent 
degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any 
point in debate.44
Pierce added that “[i]n the management of every great question,” 
Madison “took the lead in the Convention”—and rightly so because, 
about “[t]he affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most 
correct knowledge of, of any Man in the Union.”45
That history has adjudged Madison the “Father of the 
Constitution”46 suggests that Pierce was right in emphasizing his 
critical role in bringing about the “Miracle at Philadelphia.”47 The 
 41. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 59 (noting that the Virginia delegation approved 
“articles incorporating the essential elements of Madison’s pre-Convention analysis” and that 
this Virginia Plan provided the focal point for the Convention’s early debates). 
 42. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 184–89 (detailing Madison’s research and writings on 
the theory of the extended republic); id. at 195–96 (describing Madison’s motivation for taking 
notes during the Philadelphia Convention). 
 43. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 53 (2000) (observing that Madison 
“seemed to lack a personal agenda” and was “eager to give credit to others, especially his 
opponents”); id. at 57 (noting that “[u]nlike Jefferson, he could be genuinely gracious in 
defeat”); id. at 74 (highlighting “Madison’s matchless political savvy”). 
 44. William Pierce, Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal Convention, in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 87, 94. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST 1, 8 (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (noting that Madison, though “on the losing side in a number of 
important votes in the Convention[,] . . . is more nearly the author of the Constitution of 1787 
than any other man”). 
 47. Both Washington and Madison referred to the events at Philadelphia as a “miracle,” 
and Catherine Drinker Bowen used “Miracle at Philadelphia” as the title of her well-known 
account of the Constitutional Convention. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT 
PHILADELPHIA, at ix (1966). 
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Miracle at Philadelphia, however, would have no enduring impact 
unless leading states, including New York, joined in ratification. So as 
the autumn of 1787 moved toward winter, Hamilton, Madison, and 
Jay put their shoulders to the wheel. The Federalist No. 1, written by 
Hamilton, appeared on October 27. Jay contributed Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 
in a period that spanned October 31 to November 10. Madison’s first 
contribution—the justly famous The Federalist No. 10—was published 
on November 22.48 By the time Publius surrendered to exhaustion in 
May of 1788, seventy-seven separate essays had made their 
appearance in New York newspapers and eight more had surfaced in 
the book version of Publius’s work. 
Despite these efforts, word on the street in early 1788 indicated 
that ratification in New York was doubtful. America’s spiraling 
struggles under the Articles of Confederation, however, gave 
Hamilton and his collaborators cause for hope.49 The essential 
problem was well known: the Articles of Confederation vested the 
central government with so little power that the states operated much 
like independent nations.50 In theory, the federal Congress could 
wage war, make treaties, and conduct relations with Native American 
tribes. But the Articles sapped these powers of energy by denying 
Congress the authority to raise an army on its own or to impose taxes 
directly on American citizens.51 Instead, the federal government could 
gather funds and troops only by demanding contributions from the 
states, which often hesitated to comply.52 This system of “quotas” and 
“requisitions” produced a steady stream of budget shortfalls and 
 48. Jacob E. Cooke, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at xi, xiii (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 49. For major treatments of this period in addition to FISKE, supra note 15, see MERRILL 
JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
CONFEDERATION, 1781–1789 (1950), MORRIS, supra note 16, and JACK N. RAKOVE, THE 
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS (1979). A useful bibliography appears in MORRIS, supra, at 263–67. 
 50. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787, at 356–57 (1993) (noting that the states exercised even powers forbidden by the Articles of 
Confederation). Notably, the Articles of Confederation reserved to the states “every power, 
jurisdiction, and right . . . not . . . expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress 
assembled” and did not expressly delegate the Confederation Congress many of the powers the 
present-day Congress possesses, including the powers to lay taxes and to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. II. 
 51. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. 
 52. See BOWEN, supra note 47, at 5 (noting that “[t]he Confederation . . . had no power to 
collect taxes [or] defend the country” and “[o]ften enough there was no response” to Congress’s 
requisitions for money). 
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escalating aggravation among citizens throughout the nation.53 In 
particular, the defaults of some states in meeting their obligations 
bred animosities—and further defaults—on the part of other states.54 
Because of these conditions, Hamilton could observe in The 
Federalist No. 30 that “the government of the Union has gradually 
dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation.”55 
By 1787, many citizens shared his view that the federal government’s 
“radical vice” of a wholesale dependence on the states had brought 
America to the “last stage of national humiliation.”56
Problems related to commerce also plagued the Confederation. 
The central government’s inability to impose taxes left it hard-pressed 
to deal with an ever-mounting debt that had grown out of the 
Revolution.57 To make matters worse, the states created a dizzying 
array of currencies58 that experienced sharp shifts in valuation, thus 
spawning economic uncertainty and loss.59 Meanwhile, states through 
which commercial traffic flowed enacted self-serving legislation that 
burdened neighboring jurisdictions.60 These problems cried out for 
national solutions. Federal authorities were eager to act. The 
government created by the Articles of Confederation was so feckless, 
 53. Hamilton knew particularly well the difficulties of the requisition system. On October 
1, 1787, and twice thereafter, the following notice appeared in the New York Packet: “THE 
SUBSCRIBER has received nothing on account of the quota of this State for the present year. 
(Signed) ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Receiver of Continental Taxes.” Id. The situation in other 
states was doubtless worse, as New York assertedly paid a greater proportion of what the 
congress requested than did any other state in the post-Revolution years. See DE PAUW, supra 
note 17, at 10 (“When peace returned and the collection of taxes improved, New York paid a 
larger percentage of her Congressional requisitions than did any other State.”). 
 54. See BOWEN, supra note 47, at 5 (“The states which paid were bitter against the states 
which did not, and said so.”). 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 188; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 91 (adding that “[t]here is scarcely 
any thing that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which 
we do not experience”). 
 56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 93. 
 57. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 104–05 (describing Congress’s failure to produce income 
and the resultant loss of creditworthiness); MORRIS, supra note 16, at 124–25 (detailing amounts 
of budget shortfalls). 
 58. See FISKE, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that the existence of “different kinds of paper 
created such a labyrinth as no human intellect could explore”). 
 59. See id. at 176 (noting that one dollar of paper money in Rhode Island issued in May 
1786 was only worth sixteen cents by November of that year). 
 60. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 19, at 228 (describing the effects of New York’s impost 
system upon neighboring states); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 
14, at 283 (describing the need for “relief of the States which import and export through other 
States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter”). 
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however, that it lacked even the nominal power to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce. 
One instance of failed reform demonstrates pointedly the 
ineffectiveness of the government under the Articles of 
Confederation. In 1782, a fiscal crisis triggered support from twelve 
separate states for letting Congress lay duties directly on importers. 
Tiny Rhode Island, however, held out. The other states had 
conditioned their approval of the plan on unanimous support, in 
keeping with the rule that amendments to the Articles of 
Confederation required each state’s consent, so that Rhode Island’s 
rejection operated as an effective veto.61 That a state occupied by less 
than two percent of the nation’s people could block a measure so 
widely endorsed and so greatly needed struck most Americans as the 
height of folly.62
Perhaps it was poetic justice that the greatest economic crisis of 
the preconstitutional period reared its head in the same state that 
stubbornly resisted reform efforts designed to bolster the nation’s 
fiscal powers. Rhode Island, like other states, experienced intense 
controversies over the issuance of paper money during the 1780s.63 
Creditors opposed this medium of payment because it lacked 
inherent value. Debtors, however, saw things differently. They 
pressed state governments to print paper money, to assign it a fixed 
value, and to distribute it in sufficient volumes to provide a soft-
money medium for paying off hard-money loans.64 Debtors also 
encouraged legislators to pass so-called “stay laws,” which delayed 
the ability of creditors to collect debts even after they had fully 
matured.65
 61. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 33. 
 62. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 140 
(lamenting the system under which “[a] sixtieth part of the Union . . . has several times been 
able to oppose an intire bar to its operations”). 
 63. FISKE, supra note 15, at 173. 
 64. See id. at 174 (discussing efforts to use “promissory notes of a bankrupt government” to 
pay “real money” debts). Some modern historians have been more charitable toward the 
proponents of paper money. See, e.g., PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE 
ISLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1776–1841, at 88 (1977) (arguing that the “real 
motives . . . were tax relief and reduction of the state debt”); id. at 89 (arguing that “the paper 
plan must be considered a success”). 
 65. See 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 228–41 (3d ed., New York, D. Appleton 1883) (describing 
laws interfering with contracts in several states, including stay laws). 
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Many Americans, especially in the propertied classes, saw grave 
danger in debtor-relief laws and quick-fix paper money schemes. In 
Rhode Island, however, a “debtor party” captured the statehouse and 
proceeded to implement aggressive reforms. In particular, the 
legislature permitted the printing of vast amounts of new currency—
more dollars per person than in any other state—and then it forced 
creditors to take the currency in payment of past debts at face value.66 
In addition, Rhode Island laid heavy fines on merchants who rejected 
payment in currency and also went so far as to strip persons charged 
with this offense of the benefit of trial by jury.67 These moves 
triggered turmoil in Rhode Island and beyond, particularly among 
nonresidents who had lent money to Rhode Island borrowers. 
Mounting resentments raised concerns that commercial antagonisms 
soon might give way to interstate conflicts of a bloodier kind.68
The threat of armed hostilities was not without substance. In the 
winter of 1783, the Continental Army was encamped in Newburgh, 
New York, where officers fumed about the federal government’s 
wavering on whether to honor debts owed to Revolutionary War 
veterans.69 Frustrations boiled over into open talk of marching on 
Congress, and fliers advocating just that course of action began to 
circulate in camp. With a dramatic speech, General Washington 
quelled the gathering tempest.70 Three months later, however, 
another band of embittered troops did march on Philadelphia all the 
way from western Pennsylvania. Once in town, these mutineers 
ransacked local arsenals and surrounded Independence Hall. Again, 
local authorities put down the threat of violence, but not before 
 66. GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 260 (1984). 
 67. CONLEY, supra note 64, at 90. The highest court of Rhode Island refused to enforce the 
law stripping defendants of the right to a jury trial. As Patrick T. Conley has pointed out, the 
formal reason given was that the court lacked jurisdiction, but the state legislature and many 
historians interpreted the court’s action as declaring the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 95–96. 
 68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42 
(cautioning that wars may result from “[l]aws in violation of private contracts as they amount to 
aggressions on the rights of those States, whose citizens are injured by them”); see also id. at 39 
(counting “[t]he competitions of commerce” among the states as a “fruitful source of 
contention”). 
 69. On the so-called Newburgh Conspiracy, and the events leading up to it, see MORRIS, 
supra note 16, at 127–33. 
 70. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 178–79 (“The mutinous soldiers, inexpressibly moved, were 
shamed by their opposition to Washington and restored to their senses.”). 
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Congress had taken leave of Pennsylvania to seek protection from 
New Jersey’s presumably more reliable militia.71
Risks of armed conflict with foreign powers also threatened the 
infant nation. Britain, which was outraged by American refusals to 
pay off English creditors as required by the Revolution-concluding 
Treaty of Paris, ignored its own obligations to abandon forts in the 
sparsely populated Northwest and fomented Native American attacks 
on settlers in that region.72 Meanwhile, Spain, which controlled the 
lower stretch of the Mississippi, blocked American navigation of the 
river and waited for settlers in present-day Kentucky and Tennessee 
“to abandon their feeble Congress for the solid commercial 
advantage of Spanish citizenship.”73
The forces of turbulence took their most troubling turn during 
1786 in western Massachusetts. There, a crisis arose after 
conservatives in the Boston statehouse adopted a policy of paying off 
war debts in hard currency, a choice that imposed severe hardships on 
farmers and the poor, as taxes rose and money supplies tightened. As 
a result, an armed band of disillusioned locals under the leadership of 
Daniel Shays marched on a county courthouse, demanding relief.74 
The uprising was quickly put down.75 News of Shays’s Rebellion, 
however, gripped a fearful nation.76 Rhode Island’s radical paper 
 71. Id. at 180, 181–82. 
 72. Id. at 394; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
141 (2005) (noting that Britain retained five forts within New York, “thereby blocking free 
access to the lucrative fur trade and complicating American relations with Indian tribes in the 
region”). 
 73. JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 121 (3d ed. 1973). Nor were the 
Spanish mere passive observers in seeking to induce American secession in favor of Spanish 
rule. As noted by Professor Morris: “James Wilkinson, as unsavory a character as bestrode the 
Western scene, a man given to lying, bullying, or fawning as circumstances dictated, devoted 
himself to the task of separating Kentucky from Virginia in order to turn it over to Spain, for 
whom he served as a secret agent.” MORRIS, supra note 16, at 124. 
 74. E.g., FISKE, supra note 15, at 180. The Shays brigade also went after guns at an arsenal 
in Springfield, Massachusetts. Upon being told that the weapons stored there belonged to the 
federal government, Shays offered a telling response: “To hell with Congress! That crowd is too 
weak to act.” MORRIS, supra note 16, at 173. 
 75. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 15, at 182–83 (“A few minutes sufficed to scatter [Shays’s 
men] in flight.”). 
 76. The impact of the uprising was heightened because it did not stand alone. As Professor 
Morris has written: 
[B]ackcountry resistance to debt and tax collection was a contagion that spread from 
New England to pockets of law defiance evident from New Jersey to South Carolina. 
In June of 1786 “a tumultuous assemblage of the people” closed down Maryland’s 
Charles County courthouse, and boycotts against the sale of debtor property were 
spreading rapidly in other parts of Maryland. In South Carolina, farmers attacked the 
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money reforms had revealed the potential excesses of localized 
democracy. Shays’s Rebellion raised the more ominous specter that 
the new nation stood on the precipice of anarchy. 
It was in this context that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay undertook 
to make the case for ratification in The Federalist Papers. Just how 
they made their case for ratification is considered in Part II. 
II.  THE ARGUMENT OF PUBLIUS 
A modern observer might well suppose that ratification of the 
Constitution was a sure bet under the difficult conditions of late 1787. 
That, however, is far from true. Both before and after the 
Philadelphia Convention, there was broad agreement that 
proliferating problems under the Articles of Confederation called for 
a more vigorous central government. There was massive 
disagreement, however, about the way in which that government 
should be structured.77 In particular, many feared that the newly 
proposed Constitution would bring about such a dramatic shift from 
state to national power that Americans soon would labor under the 
yoke of a distant and unresponsive consolidated government. As one 
antifederalist (who, with a touch of irony, called himself “A 
Federalist”) observed: “I had rather be a free citizen of the small 
republic of Massachusetts, than an oppressed subject of the great 
American empire.”78
Critics also hurled dozens of specific objections at the handiwork 
of the Convention. Was it not clear that an aristocracy would grow 
Camden courthouse and sent the judges scurrying home. In Virginia . . . . [i]n May of 
1787 a mob burned down the King William County courthouse, destroying all the 
records, and court proceedings were blocked in other county courts as well. 
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 176. 
 77. See, e.g., Impartial Examiner V, VA. INDEP. CHRON., June 18, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 197, 199 (agreeing that “the Congress are not 
invested with sufficient powers for regulating commerce, and procuring the requisite 
contributions . . . for the common defence or general welfare” but seeing “no necessity for an 
innovation further than strengthening [the Congress]” because of fear “that no security for . . . 
liberties will remain after [the Constitution’s] adoption”); AN OLD WHIG IV, PHILA. INDEP. 
GAZETTEER, Oct. 1787–Feb. 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 18, at 30, 30–34 (asserting that “experience seems to have convinced every one, that the 
articles of confederation . . . are insufficient for the purposes intended” but objecting to the 
Constitution on the ground that the resulting federal republic would be too large to function 
effectively). 
 78. A Federalist, BOSTON GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 117, 118. 
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out of a Senate made up of a mere twenty-six members elected to six-
year terms? Was not a House of Representatives with only sixty-five 
members too small to produce meaningful connections between 
elected legislators and their constituents? Would not the absence of 
restrictions on presidential re-election inevitably lead to the 
emergence of a de facto monarch? And why on earth did the 
Constitution omit a Bill of Rights? These were fair challenges, and 
critiques of this sort found expression in hundreds of writings 
unleashed by furious antifederalists. With the proposal of the 
Philadelphia Convention, like so much in life, the devil was in the 
details. And many citizens preferred the devil they knew over the 
devil they did not. 
As the authors of The Federalist surveyed this scene, they sought 
a rhetoric suited to the purpose at hand. The essays would have to 
speak of enduring themes, and they did so. At bottom, however, the 
tracts were campaign literature. As a result, The Federalist delivered a 
partisan argument, and that argument did not draw its greatest 
strength from appeals to lofty abstractions. Instead its force came 
from a web of persuasion spun from history, emotion, shared 
concerns, and common sense, all woven together to capture the 
support of New Yorkers in 1787 and 1788. 
The whole of The Federalist exceeded the sum of its parts. Still, 
the parts were important, and critical components of the case made 
by Publius built on (1) the characteristics and desires of the local 
audience; (2) history and accepted practice; (3) practical reasoning; 
(4) imagery and metaphor; (5) openness to compromise; and (6) 
emotional responses, including responses inspired by America’s 
revolutionary tradition. 
A. Attending to the Audience 
Because Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote The Federalist for 
newspapers, they trained their sights on local readers—shopkeepers 
and shippers, farmers and merchants, the wealthy and the middle 
class, the cautious and the bold. Among these readers lurked 
concerns of all sorts, from theoretical scruples held by politically 
minded intellectuals to bottom-line fears of business owners faced 
with the prospect of dual taxation.79 The fortunes of many men—
 79. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 227–29 
(noting concerns over double taxation). 
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particularly local political figures who faced “diminution of the 
power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under 
the State-establishments”—hung in the balance.80
Hamilton took heed of these forces as he charted the direction of 
the essays. In The Federalist No. 1, he worried openly that “[t]he plan 
offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests, 
innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its 
discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, 
passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth.”81 
He also perceived that pulls against ratification were both 
“numerous” and “powerful” even for “wise and good men.”82 As a 
result, Publius set out to “determine clearly and fully the merits of 
this Constitution,” a task that would involve “examining it on all its 
sides; comparing it in all its parts, and calculating its probable 
effects.”83 In short, the Federalist Papers would be long. The authors 
would strive to give “a satisfactory answer to all the objections which 
shall have made their appearance that may seem to have any claim 
to . . . attention.”84 The argument of Publius, however, would offer 
more than a series of counterpunches. Spread through the text would 
be affirmative appeals to the interests and concerns of a diverse and 
skeptical audience situated in 1787 in the state of New York. 
In keeping with their purpose, the authors of The Federalist 
focused attention on shared worries of their time and place. Talk of 
 80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 4. 
 81. Id. Madison expressed much the same thought in No. 37: 
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely 
investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their 
real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt 
to be diminished than prompted, by those occasions which require an unusual 
exercise of it. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 231. 
 82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 4. 
 83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 231. Meticulous attention 
was necessary, Madison added, because “the act of the Convention . . . recommends so many 
important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and 
which touches the springs of so many passions and interests.” Id. at 231–32. Hamilton worried 
that such a painstaking treatment might at times prove “tedious and irksome” to readers. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 90. The cost was worth the price, 
however, because the project addressed “a subject . . . most momentous” and was complicated 
by “the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way.” Id. 
 84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 7 (emphasis added). 
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Rhode Island’s intransigence,85 interstate trade conflicts,86 and Shays’s 
Rebellion87 made frequent appearances in the essays. The writers 
drew on the fears of their day. In particular, The Federalist reminded 
readers at every turn that a failure to adopt the Constitution meant 
retaining the Articles of Confederation, under which a “melancholy 
situation” had taken hold.88
The argument of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay appealed to 
different voting blocs. They targeted prospective borrowers, 
emphasizing that credit had been “reduced within the narrowest 
limits” due to an “opinion of insecurity” born of a weak central 
government.89 They pleaded for the support of urban property 
owners, arguing that the depressed “price of improved land . . . can 
only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, 
which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks and which have a 
direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind.”90 For patrons 
of frugality, Hamilton devoted a full essay to detailing why the 
Constitution promised economies of scale that made cost-based 
objections “appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.”91 
Manufacturers and planters needed a strong union to supply “a 
flourishing marine”; otherwise a dependence on foreign carriers 
 85. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42–43 (“We 
have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence of the 
enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode-Island . . . .”) 
 86. See id. at 39–40 (noting that, left unchecked, states would tend to pursue trade policies 
to their own benefit and the detriment of their neighbors); THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 71–72 (advocating a uniform interstate trade system); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 135–37 (same); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 283–85 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James 
Madison), supra note 14, at 314 (same). 
 87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 31, 35 (cautioning 
that uprisings like Shays’s Rebellion could have dangerous consequences for the republic); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 131 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 177 (same); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 502 (same). 
 88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 92. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 74 
(noting that it had been “found, in various countries, that in proportion as commerce has 
flourished, land has risen in value”). 
 91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 13 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 82. Indeed, 
Hamilton supplemented his extensive discussion of this subject in No. 13 with a further 
treatment in No. 84. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 587 
(concluding that “the sources of additional expence from the establishment of the proposed 
constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined”). 
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would compel us “to content ourselves with the first price of our 
commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to 
enrich our enemies and persecutors.”92 Why should fishermen—
whose “spirit of enterprise” had rendered them “able to undersell 
[European] nations in their own markets”—support the 
Constitution?93 Because without a government energetic enough to 
negotiate fair treaties with foreign powers, nothing would be “more 
natural, than that they should be disposed to exclude . . . such 
dangerous competitors” from the grant of local trading privileges.94
Time and again, Publius appealed to special concerns of the New 
York audience. Equal representation of the states in the proposed 
Senate, for example, might rankle residents of large and fast-growing 
New York. Hamilton emphasized in The Federalist No. 22, however, 
that the system adopted by the Philadelphia Convention, which 
paired the Senate with a House apportioned solely on the basis of 
population, improved on the existing system, under which each 
state—no matter what its size—had only one vote.95 In The Federalist 
No. 35, Hamilton observed that alternative constitutional proposals 
would deny Congress the power of general taxation and instead 
permit only the imposition of duties on imports from foreign 
countries.96 “New-York,” he added, “is an importing State, and is not 
likely speedily to be to any great extent a manufacturing State. She 
would of course suffer in a double light from restraining the 
jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.”97 In The Federalist 
No. 41, Madison noted that New York faced special dangers because 
its “sea coast is extensive” and it “is penetrated by a large navigable 
river for more than fifty leagues.”98 Resulting vulnerabilities to naval 
assault—much heightened by “the precarious situation of European 
affairs”—made New York a likely future “hostage, for ignominous 
compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the 
rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians.”99 Safety in these 
circumstances could come only from a strong federal navy. But “[i]n 
 92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 69. 
 93. Id. at 69–70. 
 94. Id. at 70. 
 95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 138–39. 
 96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 216–18. 
 97. Id. at 217. 
 98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 275. 
 99. Id. 
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the present condition of America, the states more immediately 
exposed to these calamities, have nothing to hope from the phantom 
of a general government which now exists.”100
In The Federalist No. 25, Hamilton shifted his attention to 
northern New York, pointing to his state’s shared border with 
English-occupied Canada. Danger from British armies confronted all 
the states, but New York was “more directly exposed,” and a 
continuing drift toward disunity would require it to bear the full cost 
of border-area fortifications.101 “Upon the plan of separate provisions, 
New-York would have to sustain the whole weight of the 
establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate 
or ultimate protection of her neighbours.”102 Such a system, Hamilton 
observed, would not be “safe as it respected the other States.”103 Even 
more important, it would not be “equitable as it respected New-
York.”104
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay also sought to cultivate the support 
of their audience by plying their readers with compliments. Publius 
praised “the present genius of the people,”105 whom he described as 
“considerate and virtuous,”106 “candid and judicious,”107 “impartial 
and discerning,”108 and “intelligent and well informed.”109 The “gallant 
citizens of America,” for example, would never acquiesce in the use 
of federal armies to overthrow legitimate state authorities.110 New 
 100. Id. 
 101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 158. Nor was an 
exposure to foreign invaders of only theoretical interest to New Yorkers in the 1780s. As 
Professor Wright explained: 
In a city that had been occupied by British forces for almost seven years during the 
Revolution (longer than any other city) and in a state that was the site for major 
battles and whose northern and western frontiers had suffered from British armies 
and Indian raids, it was scarcely necessary to underline the point that war is 
unpleasant. Moreover, five of the posts that England had not given up, but had 
continued to occupy in violation of the Treaty of 1783, were in New York State. 
Wright, supra note 46, at 18. 
 102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 158. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 375. 
 106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 57. 
 107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 230. 
 108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 148. 
 109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 13. 
 110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 322. 
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Yorkers were “little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery.”111 
The very institution of republican self-government revealed that there 
exists no small “portion of virtue and honor among mankind.”112
Rhetoric of this kind created tension with those parts of The 
Federalist that emphasized the need to fashion government to the 
shortcomings of human nature, and steering a course between these 
competing ideas took some artful maneuvering. Publius met the 
challenge primarily by stressing the difference between political 
leaders and the general citizenry. Without question, some 
Americans—especially those drawn to public office—would embrace 
a “love of power”113 and prove “capable of preferring their own 
emolument and advancement to the public weal.”114 Among ordinary 
citizens, however, the great danger came not from malevolence or 
unchecked self-centeredness, but from “temporary errors and 
delusions.”115 Thus, “people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD,” 
and “[t]his often applies to their very errors.”116 The difficulty, as 
Madison explained in The Federalist No. 63, came from “particular 
moments in public affairs, when the people stimulated by some 
irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful 
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which 
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn.”117 It was no insult to recognize these conditions because 
even the most praiseworthy citizens “know from experience, that they 
 111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 424–25; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 340–41 (noting “the success . . . which 
does so much honour to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America”). 
 112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 514; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378 (arguing that “[w]ere the pictures 
which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the 
human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-
government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from 
destroying and devouring one another”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 
14, at 386 (noting that “the universal and extreme indignation which [ingratitude] inspires, is 
itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment”). 
 113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 97. 
 114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 402. Indeed, 
government service would always attract “a few aspiring characters” who seek to abuse power 
to their own “subversive” ends. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 
386. And in almost any individual representative, some “motives of a . . . selfish nature” would 
operate, including “pride and vanity.” Id. 
 115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425. 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 482. 
 117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425. 
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sometimes err.”118 Indeed (and here Publius reached the apex of 
playing both sides of the table), “the wonder is, that they so seldom 
err as they do; beset as they continually are by the wiles of parasites 
and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the 
desperate; by the artifices of men, who possess their confidence more 
than they deserve it.”119 Publius appealed to the “accuracy and 
candour”120 and the “cool and deliberate sense”121 of the broader 
community in urging ratification. Human frailty would come into play 
as citizens grappled with the Constitution because “there is a degree 
of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of 
circumspection and distrust.”122 There were, however, also “other 
qualities in human nature,” and Publius argued that the idea of self-
government reflects confidence that human virtue was sufficient, in 
the absence of tyranny, to “restrain [citizens] from destroying and 
devouring one another.”123 After all, “the people of any country . . . 
seldom adopt, [or] steadily persevere for many years in, an erroneous 
opinion respecting their interests.”124 It was largely in this way that a 
frequent depiction of the citizenry as virtuous and wise comported 
with Publius’s simultaneous calls for extreme caution in shaping the 
structures of republican self-rule. 
 118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 482. 
 119. Id. But cf. Wright, supra note 46, at 83 (asserting that Publius does not “fall back on the 
common and unfortunate view that politicians are less virtuous than private citizens”). 
 120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 314. 
 121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425. 
 122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 35 (noting that people “are yet 
remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue”). 
 123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 378; see THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 513–14 (claiming that “[t]he supposition of 
universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning than the 
supposition of universal rectitude”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, 
at 385 (noting that “[t]here is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, 
and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful 
and benevolent returns”); see also Wright, supra note 46, at 79–80 (drawing on Professor 
Scanlon’s work in asserting that Publius’s “method of ‘reasoned discourse’” reflected the 
assumption “that his readers could be helped to see beyond their immediate prejudices and 
even beyond their local or personal, but still immediate, self-interest and to decide on the basis 
of what may be termed a long-run view of their interests”); see also id. at 14 (“The authors of 
The Federalist did not . . . hold a romantic view of the nature of man, but they were influenced 
by the Age of Reason to the extent of believing that man’s reason was adequate to the task of 
devising satisfactory political institutions, provided continuity with past experience in 
government was maintained.”). 
 124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 13. 
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B. The Case from History 
Appeals to history complemented The Federalist’s focus on the 
interests of New York readers. Over and over, Madison emphasized 
that “[e]xperience is the oracle of truth”125 and “the guide that ought 
always to be followed.”126 Hamilton likewise saw history as “the 
parent of wisdom”127 and “the least fallible guide of human 
opinions.”128 More than 100 years later, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
would declare that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”129 Publius held the same view, maintaining in The 
Federalist No. 43 that “theoretic reasoning . . . must be qualified by 
the lessons of practice.”130 These words reflected an outlook of deep 
significance to the three authors of The Federalist, for each of them 
was an insatiable student of history. Madison, for example, had 
immersed himself in the study of past governments throughout the 
months preceding the Constitutional Convention,131 and Hamilton’s 
and Jay’s investigations of history were little less impressive.132 
Lessons gleaned from historical research pervaded The Federalist, 
reaching from Greek and Roman history through British experience 
to the recent experiments with government of the American states. 
1. The Ancients.  At the heart of The Federalist’s treatment of 
history—especially in Nos. 19 and 20—were sobering depictions of 
 125. THE FEDERALIST NO. 20 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 128. 
 126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 355. 
 127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 490. 
 128. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; accord THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 96 (describing history as the “best 
oracle of wisdom”). 
 129. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 
1881). 
 130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 293. 
 131. See, e.g., KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 183–85 (describing Madison’s exhaustive study of 
the history of federated governments during the spring and summer of 1786). 
 132. See CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 24 (noting “Hamilton’s omnivorous, self-directed 
reading”); id. at 52 (recounting that Hamilton “ransacked the library” while in college in his 
studies of philosophy and law); id. at 110–12 (explaining how Hamilton “constantly educated 
himself” during the war, spitting out 112 pages of notes from readings ranging from Bacon to 
Postlethwayt to Plutarch); id. at 137 (noting that “[i]n his spare time, Hamilton pored over 
financial treatises”); id. at 206 (noting that “Hamilton read widely and accumulated books 
insatiably” in the post-Revolution period and that he “never stopped pondering the ancients”). 
Jay attended King’s College in New York City beginning in 1760 (at the age of fourteen) and 
there encountered the classical histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as the legal 
theories of Grotius. WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY 9–11 (2005). 
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republics and confederacies of the distant past. Tracking then-
dominant traditions of classical learning, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 
laced their essays with allusions to Athens,133 Sparta,134 Thebes,135 the 
Achaean League of ancient Greece,136 and the Lycian League of Asia 
Minor.137 There were treatments of Rome,138 Carthage,139 and more 
modern European experiments in government.140 Careful attention 
was paid to the United Netherlands,141 Swiss cantons,142 postfeudal 
German alliances,143 and the legislature of Poland.144
 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 29, 32; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 110–17; THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 163; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra 
note 14, at 240–41; THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 374; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 425, 427. 
 134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 110–17; THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), 
supra note 14, at 426. 
 135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 111, 113. 
 136. Id. at 113; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 240–41; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 473. 
 137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 55–56; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310. 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 27; THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 14, at 209–10; THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 240–41; 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 271; THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 
(James Madison), supra note 14, at 426, 428; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 14, at 471–80. 
 139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 32; THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 426–27. 
 140. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 152 
(observing that the antifederalist objection to standing armies in times of peace was “in 
contradiction to the practice of other free nations”). 
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 33; THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 20 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 124–27; THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), 
supra note 14, at 250; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 291–92; THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508. 
 142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 122–23; THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), 
supra note 14, at 292–93. 
 143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 74; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 86; THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James 
Madison), supra note 14, at 117–20; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 
14, at 137; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 284; THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 292; THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 536–37. 
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Hellenic experience laid waste to the notion—central to the 
philosophy underlying the Articles of Confederation—that 
confederated governments could direct legislative commands only at 
member states, rather than at individuals. Indeed, 
of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down 
to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain 
vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of 
that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best 
deserved, and have most liberally received the applauding suffrages 
of political writers.145
In particular, the experiences of Lycia and Achaea revealed that a 
confederated government could hold the power to regulate 
individuals without destroying the sovereignty of confederacy 
members. “[H]istory does not inform us,” Madison wrote, “that either 
of them ever degenerated or tended to degenerate into one 
consolidated government.”146
Rome’s experiments also offered important lessons of which the 
Constitution’s drafters had taken proper heed. Was it advisable to 
require the ratification of treaties by two-thirds of the whole 
membership of the Senate, rather than two-thirds of those present to 
vote? Such an approach might require de facto unanimity among 
those in attendance, and “the examples of the Roman tribuneship” 
revealed the “impotence, perplexity and disorder” that would result 
from this form of legislative sign-off.147 Would it not be wise to 
commit the executive power to more than a single person? “Roman 
history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the 
dissentions between the consuls . . . .”148 Despite these dangers, might 
there not be offsetting gains in keeping the executive power out of the 
hands of just one officer? Rome “gives us no specimens of any 
peculiar advantages derived to the state, from the circumstance of the 
plurality of those magistrates.”149
 144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 86; THE FEDERALIST NO. 
19 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 122; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 14, at 140; THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 251; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508. 
 145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 99. 
 146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 310. 
 147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 508. 
 148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 473. 
 149. Id. 
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2. British Practice.  The authors of The Federalist often 
consulted British history, emphasizing that it “presents to 
mankind . . . many political lessons.”150 As to the Constitution’s closer 
bonding of the states, the successful integration of England, Scotland, 
and Wales provided a model for America to follow.151 It was enough 
to say in defense of the Intellectual Property Clause that the “copy 
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a 
right at common law.”152 As to the lifetime appointments of judges, 
“[t]he experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on 
the excellence of the institution.”153 British practice also supported the 
Constitution’s division of power between House and Senate in 
impeachment proceedings. After all, “[i]n Great Britain, it is the 
province of the house of commons to prefer the impeachment; and of 
the house of lords to decide upon it.”154
One high-visibility debate between federalists and antifederalists 
elicited from Publius a particularly close examination of British 
history. Critics of the Constitution had assailed its provision for two-
year House terms by invoking a favorite slogan of the day—“that 
where annual elections end, tyranny begins.”155 For Madison, 
however, “the degree of liberty retained even under septennial 
elections” in Great Britain left no doubt that two-year terms 
presented no danger of oppression.156 Indeed, even during its most 
republican episodes, Britain provided for elections no more frequent 
than once every three years.157
In similar fashion, the history of the mother country undercut 
widely voiced concerns about recognition of a congressional power to 
 150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 382. 
 151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 23–24. 
 152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 288. 
 153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 530. 
 154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 440. British 
experience also undercut complaints that a four-year term for the president was so lengthy that 
it would lead to executive domination of the legislative branch. After all: 
If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings . . . have by rapid 
strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility . . . 
while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the 
Legislature . . . what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years 
duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States? 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 485–86. 
 155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359. 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 356. 
 157. Id. 
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maintain a standing army.158 Following the defeat of King James II in 
the Glorious Revolution, after all, the drafters of the English Bill of 
Rights had provided for keeping military forces in service “with the 
consent of parliament.”159 Thus even “when the pulse of liberty was at 
its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was 
thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept 
up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate.”160 It was a 
telling point that, on this score, “[t]he patriots, who effected that 
memorable revolution, were too temperate and too well informed, to 
think of any restraint in the legislative discretion.”161
3. State Experience.  Publius bolstered his argument for 
ratification by citing American, as well as British, history. Arguments 
from state practice drew in part on the experiences of dysfunctional 
institutions. Exclusive federal regulation of the currency, for example, 
found support in “the pestilent effects of paper money” circulated by 
states whose “guilt . . . can be expiated [not] otherwise than by a 
voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been 
the instrument of it.”162 Rhode Island’s past obstinacy in resisting 
reform of the federal taxing power supported “an irresistible 
conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of 12 States, to the 
perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth” in the constitutional 
amendment process.163 Thus the Constitution properly required assent 
by only three-fourths of the states to amendments duly proposed by 
Congress. 
In some instances, the essayists drew on state practice to craft a 
fortiori arguments in support of the Constitution.164 In response to the 
contention that two-year House terms were too lengthy, for example, 
Madison pointed to the history of his own state. Although Virginia 
had provided for seven-year election cycles at the time of the 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 165–66. 
 159. Id. at 166. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 300. 
 163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 263. 
 164. Notably, in just the first fifty-two pages of his classic treatment of The Federalist, Garry 
Wills happens upon at least three a fortiori arguments based on state or British practice. See 
WILLS, supra note 28, at 43–44 (regarding the Constitution’s ratio of representatives to 
constituents); id. at 44 (regarding corruptibility and unresponsiveness of legislators); id. at 52 
(regarding the acceptability of imprecise limits on government powers). 
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Revolution, “the colony . . . stood first in resisting the parliamentary 
usurpations of Great-Britain,” and “it was the first also in espousing 
by public act, the resolution of independence.”165 It followed from 
Virginia’s experience with septennial elections “that the liberties of 
the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.”166 The case 
for two-year terms found support in another recent piece of state-side 
history as well: the “iniquitous measures” propounded in Rhode 
Island to protect local debtors had come from legislators who had 
stood for election at six-month intervals.167
Publius repeatedly argued that what was good for the local goose 
should be good for the federal gander. Critics of the Constitution, for 
example, complained that it would permit the federal government to 
impose poll taxes. Hamilton retorted: 
Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind . . . . 
Are the State governments to be stigmatised as tyrannies because 
they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the 
like power justify such a charge against the national government, or 
even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption?168
Some antifederalists questioned the wisdom of lifetime appointments 
for federal judges,169 but Publius defended this approach as 
“conformable to the most approved of the state constitutions.”170 
Some critics decried the Constitution’s blending of functions among 
 165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 358. 
 166. Id. 
 167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 423; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 360 (observing that, despite each state’s 
half-year terms of legislative office, “it would not be easy to shew that Connecticut or Rhode-
Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty than South-Carolina,” 
which had two-year terms). Even proposed rules that seemed inconsistent with state practice 
could be made to look appealing through the creative logic of Publius. In The Federalist No. 39, 
Madison brushed aside attacks on six-year terms for senators even though not one state in 1787 
tolerated legislative service of this duration. AMAR, supra note 72, at 75 (noting that no state 
senate term exceeded five years). A six-year term, Madison reasoned, is “but one year more 
than the period of the Senate of Maryland; and but two more than that of the Senates of New-
York and Virginia.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 252. Because 
the experience of those states had been distinctively positive, it followed that the six-year term 
would be present no difficulties. Id. 
 168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 229. 
 169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 522 (noting that 
this provision had “been drawn into question by the adversaries of [the] plan”). 
 170. Id. 
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the three branches of government.171 “If we look into the constitutions 
of the several states,” Madison replied, “we find that . . . there is not a 
single instance in which the several departments of power have been 
kept absolutely separate and distinct.”172 Responding to attacks on the 
congressional power to maintain a standing army, Hamilton noted 
that the framers’ proposed treatment of this subject corresponded “to 
the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing 
constitutions.”173
Publius had to walk a tightrope in relying on state constitutional 
practice because he was not, by his own admission, “an advocate for 
the particular organizations of the several state governments,”174 
whose constitutions bore “strong marks of the haste, and still stronger 
of the inexperience, under which they were framed.”175 Even so, those 
constitutions exemplified “many excellent principles” that the 
Philadelphia Convention had honored.176 At the least, these charters 
revealed that few features of the new Constitution reflected wholesale 
innovations. 
4. New York.  At the outset of the project, Hamilton 
emphasized to New Yorkers the “analogy to your own state 
constitution” of the proposed federal charter.177 Had the framers 
erred in failing to set a date for congressional and senatorial 
elections? If so, “it may be asked, why was not a time for the like 
purpose fixed” in New York’s Constitution?178 Was it wrong to let a 
 171. See, e.g., Brutus XIV, N.Y. J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 442, 446 (asserting that “a branch of the legislature should not be 
invested with the power of appointing officers” and that “[t]his power in the senate is very 
improperly lodged for a number of reasons”); Cato V, N.Y. J., Sept. 1787–Jan. 1788, reprinted in 
2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 116, 118 (decrying the Senate’s role in 
appointments, impeachment trials, and treaty ratification). 
 172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 327. 
 173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 152. Pointing to a 
particularly familiar episode of recent history, he added that the Revolution showed that state 
militias alone could not defend the nation; rather, a “regular and disciplined army” was 
required. THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 162. 
 174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 331. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
 178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 414. The answer to 
this question, Hamilton continued, was that this “was a matter which might safely be entrusted 
to legislative discretion, and that if a time had been appointed, it might upon experiment have 
been found less convenient than some other time.” Id. 
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president seek re-election? The governor of New York could seek 
new terms of office “without limitation or intermission.”179 Did the 
new Constitution create House districts too populous to allow voters 
to cast ballots wisely? “[T]he members of [the State] Assembly, for 
the cities and counties of New-York and Albany, are elected by very 
nearly as many voters, as will be entitled to a representative in the 
Congress . . . .”180 In The Federalist No. 69, Hamilton compared the 
prerogatives of the president to those of the governor of New York 
(as well as governors of other states and the King of England). This 
analysis ranged across the veto, military, pardon, legislative-
adjournment, and appointment powers. After putting the distinctively 
national matter of treaty-making by the president to one side, 
Hamilton concluded that “it would be difficult to determine whether 
that Magistrate . . . possess[es] more or less power than the Governor 
of New-York.”181 Some antifederalists argued that a proper 
constitution would provide for polling in each county,182 yet the New 
York Constitution provided for state senate elections “in the great 
districts into which the State is or may be divided,” which “at 
present . . . comprehend each from two to six counties.”183 Here, as 
elsewhere, Publius argued that in comparing the two constitutions “it 
will be impossible to acquit the one and to condemn the other.”184 
What’s more, any “similar comparison would lead to the same 
conclusion in respect to the Constitutions of most of the other 
states.”185
Reliance on the past practices of New York reflected the 
authors’ attentiveness to the nature of their audience. So, too, did the 
authors’ insistence that the readers of their essays stood at a turning 
point in history. According to Publius, it had fallen to Americans “to 
decide . . . whether societies of men are really capable or not, of 
establishing good government from reflection and choice . . . .”186 
 179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 463. 
 180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 389. 
 181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 469; see also id. at 
461–62 (noting that objections to the office and function of the vice president applied equally to 
New York’s lieutenant governor, who in similar fashion presided over the senate and assumed 
the governorship upon the death of the state’s chief magistrate). 
 182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 410–11. 
 183. Id. at 411. 
 184. Id. at 412. 
 185. Id. 
 186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 3. 
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With words of this kind, the authors of The Federalist urged their 
readers not just to follow history, but to make it. The past had proven 
that the Articles of Confederation embodied a clumsy and 
shortsighted plan. The Constitution, in contrast, held the promise of 
creating a form of government “glorious . . . to mankind.”187
C. Publius and Practical Reasoning 
According to Publius, the capacity of Americans to heed “the 
suggestions of their own good sense” was nothing less than “the glory 
of the people.”188 Given this outlook, it is not surprising that the 
authors of The Federalist often invoked “common sense” in making 
the case for the Constitution.189
Antifederalists, for example, excoriated the Constitution’s 
creation of a sweeping congressional taxing power. According to 
Publius, however, practical Americans would understand the need for 
this power because the United States would “experience a common 
portion of the vicissitudes and calamities, which have fallen to the lot 
of other nations.”190 Dreamers might see in America’s future only 
“halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age.”191 But practical 
citizens would prepare for the worst, including the prospect of costly 
wars that would present “dangers, to which no possible limits can be 
assigned.”192 A new federal government—like any government—
could abuse the taxing power. Madison, however, counted on the 
“good sense of the people of America” to perceive that “in every 
political institution, a power to advance the public happiness, involves 
a discretion which may be misapplied.”193 To be sure, antifederalist 
 187. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 230. 
 188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88. 
 189. The term “common sense” appears in THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay), supra note 
14, at 24; THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 139; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185; THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 194; THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 14, at 559, 560; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 
583. The term “good sense” is used in THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 
14, at 87, 88; THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 190; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 474; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 14, at 591. 
 190. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 193. 
 191. Id. 
 192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195–96. 
 193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 268–69. 
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“rhetoric and declamation . . . may inflame the passions of the 
unthinking.”194 Citizens who were “cool and candid,” however, would 
see that these critics had “chosen rather to dwell on the 
inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political 
advantages” to be gained from a much-strengthened federal 
government.195
Common sense combined with common experience to reveal the 
flaws of the Articles of Confederation. The Articles, for example, 
rested in part on the idea that Congress should direct its commands at 
state legislatures (rather than at individuals) because “breaches, by 
the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be 
expected . . . .”196 But why was that? Logic cut down the notion that a 
spirit of rightfulness more often characterizes “bodies of men . . . than 
individuals”;197 indeed, groups of persons were in general more 
undeserving of trust than particular individuals because concern for 
reputation “has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad 
action is to be divided among a number . . . .”198 What is more, 
common sense suggested that groups of persons who took the form of 
a state would be distinctly prone to disobey federal commands 
because “there is in the nature of sovereign power an impatience of 
controul” that conflicts with the inclination to honor duties owed to a 
larger confederation.199
According to Publius, some antifederalist arguments departed so 
far from sound reasoning that they qualified as “extravagant.”200 
Skeptics worried, for example, that a federal power to mobilize local 
militias would lead the central government to overwhelm American 
liberties. Hamilton’s reply drew on his readers’ personal knowledge 
of state militia members: 
Where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may 
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow-citizens? 
What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily 
 194. Id. at 269. 
 195. Id. 
 196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 96. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. 
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mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who participate with 
them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests?201
According to Madison, “little critics” had raised a raft of “imaginary” 
concerns,202 including the particularly far-fetched suggestion that the 
new government might forgo the collection of debts rightfully owed 
to the nation under the Articles of Confederation.203 The 
Constitution, Madison acknowledged, did not specify in terms that 
obligations owed to the federal government would survive 
ratification. But “no real danger can exist that the government would 
DARE . . . to remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext 
here condemned.”204
The reasoning of Publius often involved the drawing of 
deductions from incontestable principles. Ultimate congressional 
(rather than state) power to oversee the manner of congressional 
elections, for example, rested on the “plain proposition, that every 
government ought to contain in itself the means of its own 
preservation.”205 Could a loosely organized collection of autonomous 
states properly manage the national debt? No, because “there is 
nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.”206
 201. Id. 
 202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 295–96. 
 203. This argument stemmed from the Constitution’s specification that debts owed by the 
United States under the Articles of Confederation would persist under Article VI of the 
Constitution. One of the “lesser criticisms” of the Constitution was that the omission from this 
clause of any treatment of debts owed to the United States might imply the extinguishment of 
such debts under the interpretive rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See id. at 295 (“[I]t 
has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favour of the 
United States, as well as against them; . . . the omission has been transformed and magnified 
into a plot against the national rights.”). 
 204. Id. at 296. In similar fashion, Hamilton lambasted Cato’s suggestion that the president 
could make appointments to fill vacancies in the Senate during congressional recesses. This 
argument ignored Article I’s “clear and unambiguous” delegation of this power to state 
legislatures, or to state governors “during the recess of the [l]egislature.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
67 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 456 (emphasis omitted). Cato’s argument, Hamilton 
concluded, was “destitute . . . even of the merit of plausibility” and “must have originated in an 
intention to deceive the people.” Id. at 456–57. 
 205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 398 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 42 (adding that 
“[t]here is perhaps nothing more likely to disturb the tranquility of nations, than their being 
bound to mutual contributions for any common object, which does not yield an equal and 
coincident benefit”). 
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Madison also blasted away at critics for applying principles “to 
cases to which the reason of them does not extend.”207 Some 
antifederalists, for example, faulted the framers for failing to require 
periodic conventions to review and revise the federal Constitution. 
These critics reasoned that, because past state constitutional 
conventions had unfolded in a productive and harmonious manner, 
there could be no harm in holding periodic federal conventions going 
into the future. Madison responded that the temperance exhibited at 
earlier state conventions cast no light because each of them had 
occurred during the Revolutionary War. This fact was all-important 
because: 
[T]he existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger 
which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; 
of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, 
which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national 
questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, 
produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the 
antient government; and whilst no spirit of party, connected with the 
changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its 
leven in the operation.208
According to Madison, not one of these background conditions was 
likely to exist with respect to any future federal convention.209 Thus 
the “situations in which we must expect to be usually placed” in 
upcoming years would not “present any equivalent security” against 
factional cacophony and immoderation.210
 207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359. In a similar vein, 
Hamilton and Madison sometimes challenged antifederalist contentions on the ground that 
embracing them would produce the very evils those arguments sought to avoid. Did it make 
sense for antifederalists to object to the Constitution because it authorized a federal standing 
army? No, because the very disunion they advocated would inevitably lead to such widespread 
hostilities among neighboring states that large local standing armies would emerge. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 45–46. 
 208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 341. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. Similarly, as we have seen, antifederalists argued against two-year congressional 
terms by invoking the slogan that “where annual elections end, tyranny begins.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 359. But this slogan had come from 
Britain, where members of Parliament had gone so far as to extend their terms from three to 
seven years, adding four years to the term for which they were elected. Id. at 361. The maxim 
was therefore “wholly inapplicable to our case,” because the new Constitution fixed two-year 
terms as the supreme law of the land unalterable in any way except by constitutional 
amendment. Id. at 360. 
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The authors of The Federalist often resorted to the multipronged 
attack. In The Federalist No. 57, for example, Madison offered five 
separate reasons why House members would seldom betray the 
public trust even if they worked far from home: (1) voters would 
typically elect deserving representatives; (2) widely shared values 
would induce most representatives to act with honor and gratefulness 
toward their constituents; (3) even undeserving representatives would 
seek approbation out of self-interest; (4) frequent elections would 
provide a strong measure of accountability; and (5) the “full 
operation” of federal laws on the elected representatives themselves 
would mitigate dangers of abuse.211 Not to be outdone, Hamilton 
offered five reasons of his own against the imposition of presidential 
term limits. He argued that (1) removing the possibility of re-election 
would negate a powerful “inducement[] to good behaviour”; (2) 
avaricious or ambitious presidents would be spurred to abuse their 
office for personal gain if faced with the prospect of “descend[ing] 
from the exalted eminence forever”; (3) term limits would “depriv[e] 
the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief 
magistrate in the exercise of his office”; (4) emergencies might call for 
the leadership of “particular men” who, because of prior service, 
would be barred from office; and (5) constantly changing the 
occupant of the “first office in the nation” would interfere with the 
stability of government.212
Lawyers learn that facts persuade, and this working principle 
pervades The Federalist. Some antifederalists argued, for example, 
that the poor attendance records of members of the Confederation 
Congress cut against further empowering a government for a territory 
as expansive as the United States.213 Hamilton responded that past 
attendance problems sprang from the impotence of the 
Confederation government, rather than geographic dispersal.214 Any 
doubt in this regard fell victim to the fact that “members from the 
most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of 
 211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 385–87. 
 212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 488–91. 
 213. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 85 (“[T]he natural 
limit of a republic is that distance from the center, which will barely allow the representatives of 
the people to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs.”). 
 214. Id. 
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attendance, than those from the States in the neighbourhood of 
Congress.”215
In The Federalist No. 38, Madison used facts drawn from the 
Articles of Confederation itself to rebut a host of challenges directed 
at the new Constitution: 
Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of a 
fœderal government? The present Congress can make requisitions 
to any amount they please; and the States are constitutionally bound 
to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay 
for the paper; they can borrow both abroad and at home, as long as 
a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops 
dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; 
and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and 
unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same 
body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole 
depository of all the fœderal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to 
give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the 
same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of 
Congress. Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty? The Confederation 
has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, 
that it empowers the Senate with the concurrence of the Executive 
to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing 
Congress, without any such controul, can make treaties which they 
themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, 
to be the supreme law of the land.216
Citing these points, Madison asked how sensible citizens could resist 
ratification when “most of the capital objections urged against the 
new system, lie with tenfold weight against the existing 
Confederation.”217
This is not to say that all of Publius’s arguments themselves 
reflected good sense.218 Hamilton, for example, erred in predicting 
 215. Id. And even if that evidence did not suffice, Hamilton added, in the near future 
“intercourse throughout the union will be daily facilitated by new improvements” made to 
roads, canals, and natural waterways. Id. at 86–87. 
 216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 247. 
 217. Id. 
 218. In particular, the Papers did contain a number of simple errors. See, e.g., Roy P. 
Fairfield, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at v, xxv (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966) 
(noting Publius’s “misquoting of the Declaration, Constitution, Montesquieu, and other 
sources”); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as Reliable Historical Source Material for 
Constitutional Interpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 601, 603–14 (2003) (noting imprecision or 
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that the prohibition on appropriations to support military forces for 
more than two years would in practice provide a “powerful guard” 
against congressional maintenance of standing armies.219 History also 
has discredited his suggestion in The Federalist No. 66 that the 
requirement of the origination of revenue bills in the House would 
fall among the “important counterpoises” to senatorial power.220 
(After all, senators can easily induce sympathetic House colleagues to 
propose appropriations bills, and both chambers must enact these 
bills, regardless of where they originate.221) 
Worst of all, Publius occasionally managed to shoot himself in 
the foot. Responding to fears that federal taxing authority would 
disrupt state revenue collections, for example, Hamilton predicted 
that soon “the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves 
within a very narrow compass.”222 A moment’s reflection reveals that 
this argument had a self-defeating quality, for patrons of state power 
hardly wanted to hear that they need not worry about dampened tax 
collections because soon the states would have no meaningful powers 
at all!223 Missteps of this kind did not occur often in The Federalist. To 
the extent they did, the essayists could take some comfort in the 
error in Publius’s treatment of the size of the legislature, the quorum needed in the Senate, the 
manner of selecting the vice-president, and the manner of selecting the president). 
 219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155. Hamilton’s 
suggestion that legislators are subject to impeachment, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 450–51, has been rejected, as has his countertextual claim that 
removal (as well as appointment) of executive officers would require Senate consent. See, e.g., 
RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 350 (documenting Hamilton’s change of mind, upon his candidacy 
for Secretary of Finance, regarding the necessity of Senate consent for removal of executive 
officers). 
 220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 448. 
 221. See also AMAR, supra note 72, at 107 (noting that the Origination Clause had “little 
bite” because “the Senate would enjoy unlimited power to propose amendments”). 
 222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 34 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 210. 
 223. Little less curious was Hamilton’s treatment of peace treaties in The Federalist No. 22. 
There, he complained of the Articles’ supermajority voting requirements, voicing concern that 
such requirements would invite “bribes and intrigues” from foreign powers to “tie up the hands 
of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that 
object.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 142. To be sure, the 
new Constitution did not require treaty confirmation of two-thirds of all the states—just two-
thirds of the “Senators present.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Even so, given the Constitution’s own 
supermajority requirement, Hamilton’s assault on this feature of the Articles smacked of 
proving too much. 
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excuse that they had no choice but to turn out their work at a 
breakneck pace.224
A final rhetorical technique, which runs throughout the Papers, 
subtly bolstered Publius’s appeals to reason. Illustrative was 
Madison’s assertion in The Federalist No. 43 that the unamendable 
nature of the two-senators-per-state clause “was probably meant as a 
palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, . . . and was 
probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that 
equality.”225 In reality, of course, Madison was not confined to 
reporting what “probably” happened in Philadelphia.226 He had 
actually been there, and he knew exactly what had transpired. The 
writers who had taken on the name of Publius, however, had reason 
not to disclose anything like a personal stake in the constitutional 
project born of their own past labors. Indeed, in defending the 
Constitution’s structuring of government, Publius himself made use of 
the maxim that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge . . . in any 
cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”227 As a 
result, the voice of The Federalist took on the tone of a trustworthy 
and omniscient neutral, marked by a rhetorical detachment calculated 
to contribute to the credibility of the overall project.228
D. The Wisdom of Compromise 
In keeping with appeals to common sense, the authors of The 
Federalist often stressed the need for practical accommodation. 
 224. See David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, 
and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 852 (2001) (adverting to Hamilton’s erroneous 
and later-retracted assertion in No. 77 that the Senate must approve presidential removals, as 
well as appointments, of executive officers; adding that “under the burden of the series as a 
whole, his law practice, and his general politicking . . . , he simply got caught up in responding to 
particular anti-federalist arguments and momentarily lost the forests in the trees”—something 
“[t]hat can happen, even to a Hamilton or a Madison”). 
 225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 296. 
 226. But cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237 (purporting to 
extrapolate what “must have been” and what one “may well suppose” happened at the 
Philadelphia Convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 265 
(opining on what the delegates “must have reflected,” “must have recollected,” and “must have 
borne in mind”). 
 227. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 538; accord THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 59. 
 228. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT 165 (1992) (noting that the 
style of Hamilton and Madison rendered each of them a “pretended outsider” to the 
Convention); WILLS, supra note 28, at 22 (describing the persona of Publius as that of an 
“impartial judge”). 
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Publius, for example, did not try to convince New Yorkers that equal 
representation of the states in the Senate was a good idea. Instead, 
Madison acknowledged in The Federalist No. 62 that this feature of 
the Constitution was “evidently the result of compromise between the 
opposite pretensions of the large and the small states”229 reached in a 
setting where “neither side would entirely yield to the other.”230 Ever 
the pragmatist, he added that “[a] government founded on principles 
more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is not likely to be 
obtained from the smaller states.”231 Thus, “the advice of prudence” 
counseled that New York should accept the deal offered by the 
Constitution while it still lay on the table.232
Publius took much the same approach in defending the infamous 
Three-Fifths Compromise, under which slaves were treated as a 
fractional part of a person for purposes of allocating House seats. 
Hamilton, an ardent abolitionist, could not bring himself to write on 
this topic. Madison, however, addressed it in The Federalist No. 54, 
urging that, even though southern arguments for the three-fifths 
approach were “a little strained in some points,” this “compromising 
expedient of the Constitution [should] be mutually adopted.”233
Political realities dictated other outcomes as well. The 
appointment of senators by state legislatures, though not Publius’s 
preferred approach, embodied the selection method “most congenial 
with the public opinion”;234 thus, even if it operated as “an 
inconvenience,” this methodology had been adopted “for the 
attainment of a . . . greater good.”235 Madison also recoiled at the 
Constitution’s approach to voter eligibility, under which the franchise 
in federal elections varied from locale to locale, depending on each 
state’s qualification standards for elections to its own larger legislative 
chamber.236 Nonetheless, he urged patience with this approach 
because the better option of a uniform nationwide rule “would 
 229. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416. 
 230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237. 
 231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416–17. 
 232. Id. at 417. 
 233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 371, 369. 
 234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 416. 
 235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 401. 
 236. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
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probably have been . . . dissatisfactory to some of the States” and 
“difficult to the Convention.”237
In all these cases, according to Madison, “the Convention must 
have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of 
extraneous considerations.”238 The document now before the people 
was not a constitution planned by “an ingenious theorist . . . in his 
closet or in his imagination.”239 It was less than ideal because 
“compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct states . . . must . . . 
be a compromise of . . . many dissimilar interests and inclinations.”240 
Yet, “[i]f mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of 
government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact 
standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of 
anarchy, and the world a desert.”241
In a similar vein, Publius acknowledged that highly principled 
justifications could not be identified for many of the lines drawn in 
the Constitution. How often should elections occur? The proper 
interval of time “does not appear to be susceptible of any precise 
calculation.”242 How many representatives should represent how 
many people? Again, the problem is not “susceptible of a precise 
solution”; in fact, there is no “point on which the policy of the several 
states is more at variance.”243 How long should a person have 
citizenship before qualifying to run for the Senate? Who knows? But 
nine years “appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total 
exclusion of adopted citizens . . . and hasty admission of them, which 
might create a channel for foreign influence.”244 How many states 
should join together in ratifying a constitutional amendment 
proposed by two-thirds of the House and of the Senate? Three-
quarters of the states seemed about the right number in order to 
guard “equally against that extreme facility which would render the 
 237. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 354. 
 238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 237. 
 239. Id. at 238. 
 240. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 591. 
 241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 444. For this reason, 
Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 65 that “[t]o answer the purpose of the adversaries of the 
Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely, that particular provisions in it are not the best, 
which might have been imagined; but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious.” Id. at 
444–45. 
 242. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 355. 
 243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 373. 
 244. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 415–16. 
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Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might 
perpetuate its discovered faults.”245
These points demonstrated that the framers had sought earnestly 
to find fair accommodations among the welter of proposals put 
forward at the Convention.246 In The Federalist No. 38, Publius sought 
to build on this theme by turning antifederalist objections to the 
federalists’ advantage. The following passage (much longer in its 
entirety) catches the flavor of the argument: 
An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the 
unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector 
in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in 
the house of representatives. From this quarter we are alarmed with 
the amazing expence from the number of persons who are to 
administer the new Government. From another quarter, and 
sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is 
that the Congress will be but the shadow of a representation, and 
that the Government would be far less objectionable, if the number 
and the expence were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not 
import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power 
of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports 
and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes 
may be thrown on consumption. . . . In the eyes of one the junction 
of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of 
appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the 
executive, alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, 
the exclusion of the house of representatives whose numbers alone 
could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the 
exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the 
admission of the President into any share of power which must ever 
be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an 
unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy.247
Madison’s point was not only that the self-contradictory nature of 
antifederalist objections revealed their shaky foundations. The deeper 
point was that the framers already had navigated with extraordinary 
skill a middle course among the very clutter of criticisms now lodged 
 245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 296. 
 246. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 443 (noting 
that, for presidential impeachments, given a choice between Senate trials and trials before a 
joint session of the Senate and the Supreme Court, the framers picked “perhaps the prudent 
mean”—trial in the Senate with the Chief Justice presiding). 
 247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 244–45. 
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against the constitutional proposal. In all of this, there was a deeper 
point still: Hamilton, Madison, and Jay stood ready to discuss openly 
the Constitution’s shortcomings and, in doing so, to build a bridge of 
candor to their readers to reinforce the credibility of their larger 
project. 
One curiosity of the Federalist Papers is that they defend many 
constitutional provisions that Hamilton or Madison had condemned 
at the Philadelphia Convention. Hamilton, for example, gave an 
infamous Convention speech, later used to tar him as a monarchist, in 
which he advocated life terms for both presidents and senators.248 As 
if to reaffirm the extremity of his views, Hamilton reported to his 
fellow delegates in one of the last speeches of the Convention that 
“[n]o man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were 
known to be.”249 At the Convention, Madison also advocated many 
ideas that never found their way into the Constitution. He had been, 
for example, an unsuccessful advocate of proportionate 
representation in the Senate, of unimpeded federal authority to 
restrict the slave trade, and of a congressional power to veto state 
laws.250
Cynics might cite these points in arguing that The Federalist has a 
disingenuous quality. Perhaps so. But one might also view the essays 
through another prism—with the thought that the project may well 
have brought new clarity to these former Convention delegates.251 
One senses in reading the essays that Hamilton and Madison had 
come to grasp at a deeper level the intricacies of the document, the 
subtlety of its themes, the careful balances it struck, and the neatness 
with which its provisions fit together. At the very least, the writing of 
the Federalist Papers must have heightened the authors’ awareness of 
the framers’ extraordinary practical achievement. From a crazy quilt 
of conflicting personal, regional, and theoretical positions, the 
 248. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 289 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937) (setting forth Madison’s notes, which describe Hamilton’s speech of June 18 
before the Convention: “Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life” and “[l]et 
the Executive also be for life”). 
 249. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 645–46. 
 250. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 248, at 151. 
 251. See, e.g., ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS 147 (1984) 
(suggesting that drafting triggered a “dynamic” process in the “two strong minds” of Publius); 
WILLS, supra note 28, at 93 (noting that Hamilton critiqued the Constitution before it was 
finalized, had the benefit of learning what was “realizable” in the ratification controversy, and 
may have experienced “real changes of mind between his [Convention] speech and the 
composition of The Federalist”). 
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Philadelphia Convention had forged a coherent treatment of 
government creatively designed to meet the new nation’s needs. 
Publius knew that “a faultless plan was not to be expected.”252 For 
sensible Americans, it would suffice “that the system, though it may 
not be perfect in every part, is upon the whole a good one, is the best 
that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit, 
and is such a one as promises every species of security which a 
reasonable people can desire.”253
E. Imagery and Metaphor 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay knew well that few readers would 
pore over intricate arguments set forth in arid prose. As a result, 
Publius laced the tracts with imagery, symbolism, and color.254 
Metaphor surfaced often. A strong federal Supreme Court was 
needed because “[t]hirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction . . . 
is a hydra . . . from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can 
proceed.”255 There was “poison” in antifederalist arguments.256 It was 
time to “break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from 
the paths of felicity and prosperity.”257
Hamilton, in particular, delighted in this style of rhetoric and 
used it with frequency in castigating his adversaries. The writings of 
antifederalist critics, he observed in The Federalist No. 8, suggested 
that “airy phantoms . . . flit before [their] distempered 
imaginations.”258 In The Federalist No. 29 he added that: 
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man 
is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale or romance; 
which instead of natural and agreeable images exhibits to the mind 
nothing but frightful and distorted shapes . . . discoloring and 
 252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 232; see CHERNOW, supra 
note 8, at 246 (adding that “all the delegates at Philadelphia had adopted the final document in 
a spirit of compromise” and then “approached it as a collective work and championed it as the 
best available solution”). 
 253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 590. 
 254. See generally Philip Abbott, What’s New in the Federalist Papers?, 49 POL. RES. Q. 525, 
528 (1996) (emphasizing Publius’s “excellence as a storyteller”). 
 255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 535. 
 256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88. 
 257. Id. at 92. 
 258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 49–50. 
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disfiguring whatever it represents and transforming every thing it 
touches into a monster.259
Hamilton’s use of metaphor reached full flower in The Federalist 
No. 9, when he observed that ancient republics, even when built on 
democratic principles, had encountered only “furious storms.”260 
History offered hope because “stupendous fabrics reared on the basis 
of liberty” had “in a few glorious instances” provided models for 
America.261 Even so: 
If now and then intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we 
behold them with a mixture of regret arising from the reflection that 
the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the 
tempestuous waves of sedition and party-rage. If momentary rays of 
glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a 
transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us 
to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction 
and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted 
indowments, for which the favoured soils, that produced them, have 
been so justly celebrated.262
Hamilton’s purple prose supported a conclusion also captured in 
metaphorical terms: Americans must abandon the localized model of 
democratic self-rule to build “the broad and solid foundation” on 
which “permanent monuments” to republican liberty could rise up.263
Madison was drawn to allegory. In The Federalist No. 37, for 
example, he took on antifederalist grumbling about the difficulty of 
defining the precise reach of state and federal powers. “The most 
sagacious and laborious naturalists,” Madison explained, “have never 
yet succeeded, in tracing with certainty, the line which separates the 
district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized 
matter, or which marks the termination of the former and the 
commencement of the animal empire.”264 Madison’s message was 
hard to miss: Just as surely as students of natural science should not 
abandon biological classifications because of the difficulty of the task, 
 259. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185–86. 
 260. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton ), supra note 14, at 50. 
 261. Id. at 51. 
 262. Id. at 50–51. 
 263. Id. at 51. 
 264. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 235. 
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patrons of political science had to tolerate some measure of 
imprecision in laying down the boundary lines of power.265
In The Federalist No. 38, Madison again turned to allegory to 
attack the litany of small criticisms leveled by antifederalist objectors. 
He explained that: 
No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation, 
for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a 
porch to it; or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or 
smaller, or the cieling [sic] a little higher or lower than his fancy 
would have planned them.266
Madison drove home the point with the parable of the stricken 
man. Called by a dying patient, a group of physicians (who were 
carefully selected by him because of their distinguished 
accomplishments) unanimously agreed on a course of treatment.267 
Then, another group of doctors appeared on the scene. With 
blustering self-assurance, each of them challenged their colleagues’ 
proposed plan, insisting to the patient that it would “poison . . . his 
constitution.”268 Drawing on this story to attack antifederalist 
natterers, Madison posed two telling questions: 
Might not the patient reasonably demand before he ventured to 
follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among 
themselves, on some other remedy to be substituted? and if he 
found them differing as much from one another, as from his first 
counsellors, would he not act prudently, in trying the experiment 
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than in hearkening 
to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, 
nor agree in proposing one?269
Publius’s use of imagery in portraying America’s present state—as “a 
poor pitiful figure”270 situated at “the point of extreme 
depression”271—went far in suggesting to wavering New Yorkers that 
they needed to think hard about a change of national direction. And 
 265. See id. (recounting that “[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill in the science of 
Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three 
great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary”). 
 266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 246–47. 
 267. Id. at 242–43. 
 268. Id. at 243. 
 269. Id. 
 270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 23. 
 271. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 35. 
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the imagery employed in describing America’s unrealized potential—
as a nation forged in a “common bond of amity,”272 united by “the 
affection of friends,”273 and “not heated by the local flame”274—
bespoke the wisdom of embracing the much-strengthened central 
government proposed by the new Constitution. In all of this, Publius 
sought to render more graphic and more gripping the reasoned 
arguments for ratification around which The Federalist was built. 
F. Appeals to Emotion 
The essence of The Federalist lay in its presentation of 
relentlessly logical arguments in an “elevated and philosophical 
tone.”275 The authors, however, sought to appeal to the heart as well 
as to the head. They did so, most of all, by characterizing in heatedly 
unflattering terms their antifederalist adversaries, as well as the 
contentions those adversaries advanced. 
Some antifederalist arguments involved overreaches that 
exposed their authors to obvious attack. In The Federalist No. 27, for 
example, Hamilton mocked the suggestion that only military troops 
could enforce federal law as resting “on mere general assertion; 
unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of . . . 
reasons.”276 In The Federalist No. 29, he was no less dismissive of 
antifederalist predictions that the proposed new government would 
inevitably abuse its military powers. As he wrote: 
At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the 
liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are 
to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles to tame 
the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of 
Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the 
refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons, 
who rave at this rate, imagine, that their art or their eloquence can 
impose any conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for 
infallible truths?277
 272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 591. 
 273. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 294. 
 274. Id. 
 275. James W. Ducayet, Note, Publius And Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The 
Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 852 (1993); see RAKOVE, 
supra note 34, at 132 (describing the “lucidity and cool rationality” of The Federalist). 
 276. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 171. 
 277. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 186. 
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Madison denigrated those who detected a grant of unlimited 
regulatory powers in the General Welfare Clause, which by its clear 
terms concerned only the federal taxing and spending authority. “No 
stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these 
writers labour for objections,” he exclaimed, “than their stooping to 
such a misconstruction.”278 In essence, the authors of The Federalist 
kept asking: Who can believe such critics? “A bad cause seldom fails 
to betray itself,” Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 41, adding that 
“[o]f this truth, the management of the opposition to the Federal 
Government is an unvaried exemplification.”279
Challenges to the credibility of antifederalist writers sometimes 
shaded into more aggressive forms of attack. Antifederalist objections 
to lifetime judicial appointments, for example, showed “the rage for 
objection which disorders their imaginations and judgments.”280 
Concern expressed about oppression at the hands of federally 
controlled state militias was “so far fetched . . . that one is at a loss 
whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery.”281 To Madison, 
antifederalist arguments “must appear to every one more like the 
incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged 
exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions 
of genuine patriotism.”282 Critics who expounded self-evidently 
strained positions had to be acting out of self-serving pettiness, if not 
“magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement.”283
In effect, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay sought to “double dip” on 
their invocations of history and reason. After laying out an argument 
said to be unanswerable by “men of discernment,”284 they would ask 
how that argument could be rejected by anyone not driven by “a 
predetermination to condemn,”285 a “distempered jealousy,”286 
 278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 277. 
 279. Id. at 274. 
 280. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 522. 
 281. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. 
 282. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 321. 
 283. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 145. In The 
Federalist No. 9, the unrelenting Hamilton suggested why antifederalists might advocate a 
system of atomized states in separate subconfederacies. “[T]he multiplication of petty offices,” 
he observed, might “answer the views of men, who possess not qualifications to extend their 
influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53. 
 284. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195. 
 285. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 232. 
 286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 399. 
COENEN FINAL.DOC 11/28/2006  3:50 PM 
2006] THE FEDERALIST 519 
 
“obstinacy, perverseness or disingenuity,”287 or “political 
fanaticism.”288 Could expressions of concern about the central 
government’s oppression of the citizenry with state militias truly 
reflect “the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning 
people?”289 More likely, they were “the inflammatory ravings of 
chagrined incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts.”290 For Hamilton, 
expressions of concern about a standing army smacked of scare tactics 
“unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.”291 “[A] man of 
calm and dispassionate feelings,” Hamilton opined, “would indulge a 
sigh for the frailty of human nature; and would lament that in a 
matter so interesting to the happiness of millions the true merits of 
the question should be perplexed and entangled by [these] 
expedients.”292
Publius did not hesitate to suggest that antifederalist contentions 
reflected “disingenuous artifice,”293 “false impressions,”294 “political 
legerdemain,”295 and the “exaggerated colours of 
misrepresentation.”296 Hamilton, Madison, and Jay questioned 
whether antifederalists were “sincere in their opposition”297 and urged 
readers to consider whether opposing essayists were so driven by an 
“imprudent zeal”298 that they might seek “to instill prejudices at any 
price.”299 In all of this there was irony, for Publius had both professed 
 287. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195. 
 288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. In The 
Federalist No. 29, after obliterating the contention that federal authorities could not deputize 
citizens for law enforcement purposes, Publius asked: “What shall we think of the motives which 
could induce men of sense to reason in this manner?” Id. at 183; accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 
31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195 (“How else could it happen . . . that positions so 
clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of 
the union, should have to encounter any adversaries . . . ?”). 
 289. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 186–87. 
 290. Id. at 187. 
 291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155. 
 292. Id. 
 293. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. 
 294. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 54. 
 295. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 227. 
 296. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204; see THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 154 (warning of “an experiment 
upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive or by the 
overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous”). 
 297. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 195. 
 298. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 206. 
 299. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. 
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at the outset an intention to appeal only to “the genuine and sober 
dictates”300 of the reader’s judgment and chided other essayists for 
“the bitterness of their invectives.”301 In his concluding essay, 
Hamilton went so far as to congratulate himself on the temperance he 
had displayed in taking on critics of the Constitution: 
I trust at least you will admit, that I have not failed in the assurance I 
gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavours should be 
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and 
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to 
disgrace political disputants of all parties . . . .302
Then, touching the edges of self-contradiction, Hamilton added: 
The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which 
has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, 
has something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the 
indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of 
the calumny. . . . And the unwarrantable concealments and 
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to 
keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand 
the reprobation of all honest men.303
Perhaps Hamilton, Madison, and Jay could not resist the urge to 
decry political opponents whose own writings brimmed with 
“unhallowed language,”304 “virulent invective,”305 and “petulant 
declamation.”306 This was an era, after all, in which one writer might 
describe another as a “monkey,”307 a “blockhead,”308 or even among 
“the ‘meanest traitors that ever dishonoured the human character.’”309 
In a lamentably low moment, the essayist Inspector had dubbed 
Hamilton “Tom Shit” (the actual spelling was “Tom S—t”) and 
 300. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589. 
 301. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 5. 
 302. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589. 
 303. Id. 
 304. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88. 
 305. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204. 
 306. Id. 
 307. DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 100 (quoting one writer’s barb that “[a] monkey has more 
unexceptionable claim to reason” (quoting A Friend to Common Sense, N.Y. J., Dec. 18, 1787)). 
 308. Id. (quoting comment by “Examiner” that “[a]s to that sniveling blockhead, 
Democritus, his drunken performance does not indeed merit a reply” (quoting Examiner III, 
N.Y. J., Dec. 18, 1787)). 
 309. BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW 107 (2003). 
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described him as a mixed-race “mustee” who had “quitted [his] native 
soil in the torrid zone.”310 Faced with vilification of this sort, 
Hamilton—not surprisingly—confessed to moments in which 
“moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been 
so copiously vented . . . without emotions that disturb its 
equanimity.”311 And to such remarks, he added the telling clincher 
that, if the line of proper discourse had been crossed, the wrong had 
occurred “neither often nor much.”312
It may be that Publius lashed out at antifederalist adversaries 
because natural human feelings of resentment left no choice. It may 
be that, as Hamilton stated in defense of his most heated rhetoric, 
explicit accusations of antifederalist mendacity were necessary to help 
“sincere lovers of their country” conduct a “fair and candid 
examination” of the Constitution.313 A broad-gauged look at The 
Federalist, however, suggests that another motive was at work. 
Through a constancy of aspersion tied to reasoned argument, Publius 
sowed the seeds of skepticism at a visceral level. By portraying 
antifederalists as dark-hearted as well as wrong-headed, Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay appealed to deep-seated human sensibilities tied to 
pride, caution, resentment, indignation, and even self-preservation. It 
is hardly surprising that, in pursuing their project of persuasion, the 
authors of The Federalist should draw on forces rooted so deeply in 
the human psyche. 
The Federalist’s emotional appeal for ratification had a positive, 
as well as a negative, edge. In particular, The Federalist’s authors 
aligned the Constitution, its framers, and its defenders with the spirit 
of the American Revolution and the intellectual forces that had given 
 310. CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 245. Mindful of these excesses, Albert Furtwangler 
emphasized “the consistent high tone” of The Federalist. FURTWANGLER, supra note 251, at 81; 
see also id. at 75 (asserting that Publius “practiced severe restraint”); id. at 81–82 (claiming that 
Publius’s work “served as a damper on the violence of the ratification debate” and “shows three 
important writers laboring to assert calm reason”); id. at 97 (arguing that “the authority of 
Publius is strong because of his high civility”). Particularly in the context of a tempestuous time, 
this depiction has some accuracy. Moreover, it would be wrong to suppose that name-calling 
pervades The Federalist, most of which is given over to logical examination of relevant subjects. 
Even so, the appellations collected in the text—and many others too—counsel caution in 
characterizing The Federalist in terms as unequivocal as Furtwangler employs. 
 311. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 204. 
 312. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 589. 
 313. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 155 (referring to 
arguments that the Constitution did not prevent standing armies in peace time as “clamours” 
and “dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition”). 
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it birth. Their essays cited the Declaration of Independence314 and its 
great author, Thomas Jefferson.315 The heroes of American 
independence had “accomplished a revolution which has no parallel 
in the annals of human society,”316 and Publius portrayed the 
Constitution as the logical continuation of that revolutionary process. 
As Madison put the point in The Federalist No. 14, for a people bold 
and ingenious enough to break the chains of British oppression, “[i]t 
is only to be lamented, that any of her citizens should wish to deprive 
her of the additional merit of displaying” the “full efficacy” of 
republican self-rule.317
Like the Revolution, the Constitution would draw Americans 
together: “[T]he mingled blood which [Americans] have shed in 
defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their union, and excite 
horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.”318 Like 
the Revolution, the Constitution would promote ideals far removed 
from the petty interests that marked America’s experience under the 
Articles of Confederation. “Was . . . the hard earned substance of 
millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, 
liberty and safety; but that the Governments of the individual 
States . . . [might] be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of 
sovereignty?”319 And like the Revolution, the Constitution was rooted 
in a selfless collaboration of fearless and far-sighted patriots. Indeed, 
the Philadelphia Convention had brought together “some of the most 
distinguished members of [the Revolutionary Congress of 1774], who 
have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and 
abilities.”320
 314. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 265 (arguing for 
the right to “abolish or alter” the government (quoting the Declaration of Independence)). 
 315. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 335 (discussing 
Jefferson’s constitutional efforts in Virginia). 
 316. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 89. 
 317. Id. at 84–85. 
 318. Id. at 88. 
 319. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 309. 
 320. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 12. Jay went so far as to suggest 
that the Philadelphia Convention was rightly viewed as the second coming of the “Memorable 
Congress of 1774.” Id. at 11. As with the work of the Convention, the proposals of that 
“Patriotic Congress” had caused “the Press . . . to teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers 
against [its] measures” even though time had “proved their wisdom.” Id. Both assemblies had 
brought together men “convened from different parts of the country,” id., who gave themselves 
over for an extended period to a process of “mature deliberation,” id. at 12. Indeed, “some of 
the most distinguished members of [the 1774] Congress . . . who have grown old in acquiring 
political information, were also members of this Convention.” Id. Thus, “if the people at large 
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It is of interest that the names of Washington and Franklin 
appear in none of the eighty-five essays. Even so, the stature of these 
luminaries and their fellow framers overhung all that Publius wrote.321 
In The Federalist No. 37, Madison recalled that “[t]he history of 
almost all the great councils and consultations, held among mankind 
for reconciling their discordant opinions . . . is a history of factions, 
contentions, and disappointments; and may be classed among the 
most dark and degrading pictures which display the infirmities and 
depravities of the human character.”322 In contrast, the Philadelphia 
Convention had cast a “lustre to darken the gloom.”323 Drawing on 
the image of the selfless patriot, Madison proclaimed that “all the 
deputations composing the Convention, were either satisfactorily 
accommodated by the final act; or were induced to accede to it, by a 
deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and 
partial interests to the public good.”324
Publius made use of America’s revolutionary heritage in a 
variety of ways. For example he assured readers that, although the 
Constitution included novel elements, citizens who had pressed a 
revolution to success should not hesitate to embrace “what is new.”325 
Many innovations had been “displayed on the American theatre,” 
had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had then been fully tried or 
generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the 
Convention.” Id. Notably, the very idea of a constitution coming forth from a convention was a 
revolutionary innovation. In the past, Madison explained, the task of framing a government had 
fallen to “some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity”—like Minos 
of Crete, Lycurgus of Sparta, or Romulus of Rome. THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), 
supra note 14, at 240. The very different mode of the proceeding in Philadelphia reflected an 
“improvement made by America,” and it underscored the singularity of the Convention’s 
achievement. Id. at 241. This achievement, according to Madison, was all the greater because 
there was no “want of . . . care in the investigation” conducted by the assembled delegates. Id. 
So it was because those gathered had recognized “that the hopes and expectations of the great 
body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety, to the 
event of their deliberations.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 264. 
 321. The competence of the Philadelphia delegates was unquestionably broad and deep. As 
Catherine Drinker Bowen has written: 
Nearly three-fourths [of the delegates] had sat in the Continental Congress. Many 
had been members of their state legislatures and had helped to write their state 
constitutions in the first years after Independence. Eight had signed the Declaration, 
seven had been state governors, twenty-one had fought in the Revolutionary War. 
When Jefferson in Paris read the names he said it was “an assembly of demi-gods.” 
BOWEN, supra note 47, at 4. 
 322. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 238. 
 323. Id. at 239. 
 324. Id. 
 325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 88. 
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and it was “the glory of the people of America” to eschew “a blind 
veneration for antiquity.”326 In The Federalist No. 11, Hamilton sought 
to build support for the Constitution by tapping into optimistic 
notions of American ascendancy and uniqueness. Disunion, he 
admonished, would vindicate the “arrogant pretensions of the 
European” that had “tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of 
the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her 
benefit.”327 It had fallen to America to rise above the station of long-
oppressed Asians and Africans and to “vindicate the honor of the 
human race.”328 Hamilton’s words crackled with patriotic fervor: 
Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! 
Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble 
union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the 
controul of all trans-atlantic force or influence, and able to dictate 
the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!329
The Federalist’s celebration of the Revolution also helped allay 
concerns about the purported unlawfulness of the Philadelphia 
Convention.330 One problem arose from the fact that the Constitution 
would take effect upon approval by only nine states, even though the 
Articles of Confederation in express terms conditioned their 
modification on unanimous state action.331 Another problem existed 
because the Confederation Congress had directed delegates to meet 
“for the sole and express purpose” of proposing modifications to the 
 326. Id. 
 327. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 72. 
 328. Id. at 72–73. 
 329. Id. at 73. 
 330. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison) (discussing this subject at 
length). The debate on whether the ratification was, strictly speaking, legal continues to this day. 
Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside 
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994) (arguing that the founding was legal because it 
was rooted in popular sovereignty), with Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional 
Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 476 (1995) (rejecting the idea that the founding was 
“consummately legal”), and Henry Paul Monaghan, We The People[s], Original Understanding, 
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121 (1996) (characterizing Amar’s 
argument as “appealing, but historically groundless”). 
 331. Compare ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (“[N]or shall any alteration at any time 
hereafter be made in any of [the Articles of this Confederation]; unless such alteration be 
agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of 
every State.”), with U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, 
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the 
Same.”). 
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Articles of Confederation, and not for the purpose of proposing an 
entirely new charter of government.332 Responding to critiques based 
on these facts, Madison focused on the same principle of “absolute[] 
necess[ity]” that had spawned the American Revolution.333 For 
Publius, the “law of nature and of nature’s God” dictated “the great 
principle of self-preservation” and required abandonment of political 
institutions at odds with “the safety and happiness of society.”334 The 
Philadelphia delegates, much like the heroes of the Revolution, had 
encountered “a system so radically vicious and unsound” that it did 
not “admit . . . of amendment” but instead required “an entire change 
in its leading features and characters.”335 The “peculiarly 
distinguished” leaders who gathered in Philadelphia thus chose the 
path of not “sacrificing substance to forms,” but instead of “exercising 
a manly confidence in their country, by . . . pointing out a system 
capable in their judgment of securing its happiness.”336 Like the 
Revolution, this action reflected the “patriotic emotion” of the 
“virtuous citizen.”337 “[I]f [the framers] had exceeded their powers,” 
Publius concluded in The Federalist No. 40, they were—just like the 
leaders of a decade before—“required, as the confidential servants of 
their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to 
exercise the liberty which they assumed.”338
According to Publius, the Constitution was properly aligned not 
only with the spirit of the Revolution but with the views of great 
philosophers who helped spur revolutionary thinking. The essayists 
cited thinkers such as Grotius, Mably, and Hume, noting with 
Enlightenment-era enthusiasm that “[t]he science of politics . . . like 
most other sciences has received great improvement” over time.339 
Publius also relied on contemporary writers like Blackstone340 and the 
 332. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 259. 
 333. Id. at 264. 
 334. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 297. 
 335. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 144–45. 
 336. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 266. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 267. 
 339. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 51. 
 340. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 465, 467 (citing 
Blackstone in footnote); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 577 
(citing the “judicious Blackstone”). 
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English essayist Junius.341 The authors of The Federalist, however, 
heaped their most lavish attention on the writings of the French 
political philosopher Montesquieu, who had developed and defended 
the notion of separated governmental powers in his masterpiece, The 
Spirit of Laws.342 In challenging the proposed Constitution, 
antifederalists trumpeted this work, extracting from it the idea that 
republican governments stood no chance of success except in small 
geographical settings.343 In The Federalist No. 9, Hamilton sought to 
debunk this reading of Montesquieu, thus aligning the name of the 
great political philosopher with the work of the Philadelphia 
Convention.344
Did an even higher authority support the case for ratification? 
Jay wrote in The Federalist No. 2 that “it appears as if it was the 
design of Providence, that [this] band of brethren, united to each 
other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of 
unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties.”345 Hamilton could not bring 
himself to urge that God had taken sides in the ratification debate,346 
but Madison seemed ready to make the case. In The Federalist No. 37, 
he first celebrated the solidarity and success of the Philadelphia 
 341. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 479 (citing the 
“celebrated Junius”). 
 342. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53–54 (quoting 
Montesquieu at length); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 295 
(quoting Montesquieu on the “advantages of a confederate republic” in quelling insurrection). 
For background information about many of the authors Publius cites, see generally Robert G. 
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1095–136 (2004). 
 343. See, e.g., Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 363, 368 (quoting Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws on the 
advantages of a small republic); Cato III, N.Y. J., Oct. 25, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 18, at 109, 110 (same). Storing believes Publius was responding 
specifically to Cato’s invocation of Montesquieu. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 18, at 127 n.11 (editorial note). 
 344. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 53–54 (quoting 
Montesquieu’s advocacy of reforms “by which smaller States agree to become members of a 
larger one,” and thus arguing that his writings “contain luminous abridgement of principal 
arguments in favour of the Union”). 
 345. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay), supra note 14, at 9. 
 346. So it was even though the New Yorker apparently was, in some fashion, a religious 
man. See CHERNOW, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that “Eliza never doubted her husband’s 
faith,” although “Hamilton refrained from a formal church affiliation”); see also id. at 205 
(adding that, although Hamilton “did not seem to attend church regularly,” he probably 
embraced deism and “never doubted God’s existence”). See generally Douglass Adair & Marvin 
Harvey, Was Alexander Hamilton a Christian Statesman?, reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
230 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1967). 
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Convention in the face of overwhelming odds. Then he turned to the 
broader theme: 
It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this 
circumstance, without partaking of . . . astonishment. It is impossible 
for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it, a finger of that 
Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended 
to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.347
III.  JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON THE FEDERALIST 
The preceding account reveals that The Federalist embodies a 
strategic argument designed to win an intense political campaign. This 
historical fact raises a question of pressing contemporary significance: 
How does the argumentative nature of the essays affect the legitimacy 
of relying on them as a source of modern-day constitutional 
interpretation? 
The question is timely for two reasons. First, in recent decades 
the Supreme Court has invoked The Federalist with far greater 
frequency than in earlier time periods; indeed, as Professor Ira Lupu 
documents, “[m]ore than half of all the Supreme Court decisions in 
which one or more citations to The Federalist appear have been 
rendered since 1970.”348 Second, in a bevy of recent scholarly writings, 
commentators have grappled with the question whether the courts 
have any business consulting The Federalist as they search for 
constitutional meaning.349 Not surprisingly, some observers argue that 
the essays should carry little interpretive freight precisely because of 
the key point developed in this paper⎯namely, that The Federalist 
was a highly argumentative and politically motivated document. 
These analysts contend that it is unsound to seek the Constitution’s 
 347. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 14, at 238. 
 348. Lupu, supra note 5, at 1330. 
 349. See generally Ducayet, supra note 275; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme 
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 
(1998); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998); J. Michael Martinez & William D. 
Richardson, The Federalist Papers and Legal Interpretation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 307 (2000); 
McGowan, supra note 224; Tillman, supra note 218. 
COENEN FINAL.DOC 11/28/2006  3:50 PM 
528 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:469 
 
meaning by consulting what was at worst “propaganda”350 and at best 
“political advocacy.”351
Critiques of this kind, while understandable, tend to oversimplify 
analysis, in part because there are different theories about why courts 
may use The Federalist to help resolve constitutional ambiguities. In 
particular, various observers posit five significant arguments in 
support of judicial reliance on the Papers. According to these 
theories, judicial use of The Federalist properly reflects (1) their 
iconic status; (2) their utility as “legislative history”; (3) their 
dictionary-like character; (4) their function as learned commentary; 
and (5) their embodiment of exceptionally wise insights about the 
sound functioning of government. Any fair consideration of The 
Federalist’s role in constitutional interpretation must take account of 
each of these approaches, and I undertake such an evaluation in the 
pages that follow. I offer this evaluation only as a tentative account of 
my still-developing views of this complex subject. Even this 
preliminary account suggests, however, that adherents of all five 
theories have much work to do in reconciling their positions with the 
argumentative purpose of The Federalist. Nonetheless, in the end, 
that purpose does not preclude judicial reliance on the essays. In fact, 
in one important way, the authors’ purpose of persuasion reinforces 
the case that courts should make use of The Federalist in resolving 
hard questions of constitutional law. 
A. The Federalist as Icon 
The first argument for the propriety of judicial use of Publius’s 
writings is the most straightforward. According to this theory, The 
Federalist stands at the heart of our legal culture. It is celebrated. It is 
revered. It is the subject of grade school social studies and high school 
civics classes. How can it possibly be⎯so the argument goes⎯that 
courts should not consider in the process of constitutional 
interpretation a text that is almost as basic to American law as the 
Constitution itself? It is simply unthinkable, on this view, that courts 
could ignore a legal text of such iconic status.352
 350. Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1309. 
 351. Manning, supra note 349, at 1339 (adding that the essays’ contents thus “may at times 
reflect the exigencies of debate”). 
 352. For one variation of this argument, see Manning, supra note 349, at 1355 n.69 
(discussing The Federalist’s “canonical status” and possibility of its legitimate use as an 
interpretive tool because it has “become an important part of a long-standing constitutional 
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The difficulty with this argument is that many things are icons. 
Elvis is an icon. The American Flag is an icon. The work of 
Shakespeare is an icon. But neither Elvis nor the Flag nor 
Shakespeare tells us anything about the meaning of the Constitution. 
The obvious response to these observations is that The Federalist is an 
icon that specifically concerns the Constitution. But so what? The 
Federalist may be an icon that concerns the Constitution for reasons 
that provide it with no serious claim to legitimacy as a source of 
constitutional interpretation. Its fame might result primarily from an 
emotional sense of connection to its celebrated (indeed, iconic) 
authors. Or its glory might stem⎯especially in light of its 
argumentative purpose⎯from its association with the great victory 
achieved in securing ratification of the Constitution. These things 
might make The Federalist an icon, but they do not make it a proper 
indicator of constitutional meaning. 
In fairness, much of the rhetoric that concerns and supports The 
Federalist’s celebrated stature does suggest, at least at first blush, that 
it is a valuable wellspring of constitutional information. Chief Justice 
John Marshall, for example, described the essays as “a complete 
commentary on our [C]onstitution,”353 and Justice Samuel Chase 
attributed to Publius “extensive and accurate knowledge of the true 
principles of Government.”354 These Justices, however, never 
considered the critical question whether the argumentative nature of 
The Federalist undermines its status as a sound source of 
constitutional meaning. Even more important, the Supreme Court as 
a whole has never considered in explicit terms this now-familiar line 
of attack. In essence, writers like Chief Justice Marshall and Justice 
Chase do little more than assume the conclusion that The Federalist 
merits attention in interpreting the Constitution. 
In the end, the argumentative nature of The Federalist threatens 
its claim as an authoritative source as to the meaning of the 
Constitution. The reason why is simple: It is hard to say that The 
Federalist sets forth an authoritative elaboration of the Constitution, 
culture”). See also Ducayet, supra note 275, at 821 (noting that “The Federalist has long enjoyed 
a talismanic status in American constitutional interpretation” and that courts “start from the 
premise that [the Papers] are vested with a special kind of power to help resolve issues of 
constitutional meaning”); id. at 856 (suggesting that, because “The Federalist occupies an 
important position within American political culture,” a proper theory of interpretation “ought 
to account for [it] in some fashion”). 
 353. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821). 
 354. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798). 
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when its purpose was not to set forth such an elaboration, but instead 
was to achieve a political objective of generating popular support for 
the Constitution and the election of proratification delegates. Many 
forms of advocacy, after all, are precisely the sorts of materials that 
judges would never cite as useful touchstones of textual meaning. For 
example, great briefs might be filed in constitutional cases, and great 
oral presentations might be delivered, too. Yet the Supreme Court 
would not give authoritative legal status to Thurgood Marshall’s 
argument in Brown v. Board of Education or to Clarence Darrow’s 
speeches at the Scopes Trial, even though those addresses have 
achieved iconic status. Even more to the point, it is almost 
unimaginable that courts charged with ascribing meaning to a legal 
text would rely on partisan campaign literature and one-sided letters 
to the editor. Yet these labels apply readily to The Federalist Papers. 
For these reasons, it is eminently sensible to wonder why the modern 
court, in discharging its interpretive mission, should give attention to 
writings that embody “a brief in favor of ratification,”355 and that 
reflect⎯to use Madison’s own words⎯“the zeal of advocates”?356 
There may be a good answer to this question. But it does not suffice 
to say, without more, that The Federalist has a towering stature. 
B. The Federalist as Legislative History 
A more nuanced defense of The Federalist has its roots in the 
longstanding practice of considering background legal 
materials⎯such as committee reports and floor debates⎯in ascribing 
meaning to ambiguous legal texts. The idea behind the consideration 
of such materials is that the touchstone of interpretation should be 
the intention of the lawgivers; thus, if the text of the law itself is 
ambiguous, courts may consider statements made in the lawgiving 
process by or on behalf of the lawgivers to clarify what their 
intentions were.357 Building on this thought, some analysts suggest 
that The Federalist should count in constitutional interpretation 
because it qualifies as a form of legislative history. The argument 
begins with the idea that the intentions of the ratifiers, rather than 
 355. Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. 
L.J. 759, 765 n.25 (1994). 
 356. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 187, 189 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 357. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005) 
(describing the historical use of legislative intent in judicial opinions). 
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those of the Philadelphia framers, provide the decisive source of 
constitutional meaning because it was the ratifiers who brought the 
Constitution to life.358 It thus follows, as Professor Amar has written, 
that courts may cite the essays because they “were consciously quoted 
and used more than any other source during the ratification 
period.”359
There are major difficulties with this line of analysis. One 
difficulty is that some judges and commentators⎯Justice Scalia most 
prominently among them⎯do not believe that it is ever legitimate to 
consider legislative history in interpreting statutes.360 Adherents of 
this position rely in part on the artificiality of ascribing a unitary 
intent to the diverse body of representatives who constitute a 
legislative majority.361 This argument applies a fortiori to 
constitutional interpretation because it is necessarily more difficult to 
discern the intention of thirteen deliberative bodies than to discern 
the intention of a single legislature.362 For analysts who think like 
 358. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 374 
(presenting opinion of James Madison that the proposed Constitution “was nothing more than 
the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the 
voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions”); Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 447, 447–48 (noting that the “legitimate meaning” of 
the Constitution must be derived either in the text or “in the sense attached to it by the people 
in their respective State Conventions,” not “in the opinions or intentions of the Body which 
planned & proposed the Constitution”). 
 359. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1498 n.285 
(1987). A variation on this argument is that, even if the intentions of Philadelphia framers are 
paramount, The Federalist provides strong evidence of their intentions because Madison and 
Hamilton were present at the Convention and participated in its work. See, e.g., Ducayet, supra 
note 275, at 841–42. This history-of-the-writing theory suffers from even more problems than 
the history-of-the-ratification approach discussed in the ensuing text, in part because it is 
doubtful that the Philadelphia framers’ intentions should count for much of anything in 
constitutional exegesis. See supra note 358. Even if their intentions do count, however, it is 
questionable whether The Federalist provides a very good account of what those intentions 
were. See Ducayet, supra note 275, at 845–47. In part this is the case because of the 
argumentative nature of the essays; after all, adoption of an argumentative purpose meant that 
“the work was not intended as a recapitulation of the convention deliberations.” Id. at 845 
(emphasis added). 
 360. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29–37 (1997) (explaining 
Justice Scalia’s rationale for disfavoring legislative history). 
 361. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 92 (1984) (noting that “the most humble judge will fail if given a 
charge to recreate in his own mind the 535 minds that contemplated yesterday’s problems”). 
 362. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1308 (asserting that “[i]f the collective ‘intent’ of the 
bicameral legislature is an incoherent concept, . . . the collective ‘understanding’ of an entire 
nation during a constitutional moment must be even more so”). There are other reasons as well 
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Justice Scalia, it follows easily that courts may not cite The Federalist 
on the theory that it qualifies as legislative (or, more accurately, 
constitutional) history.363
Even for those who endorse the use of legislative history, efforts 
to rely on The Federalist raise profound problems. It is now settled as 
a historical matter, for example, that the Papers did not circulate 
widely outside New York.364 How, then, can they provide legislative 
history for the ratification conventions as a whole?365 In addition, 
ratification had already occurred in most of the states before many of 
the essays (including Hamilton’s famous treatments of the judicial 
power) were even published.366 How can the essays provide legislative 
history for official action that in fact predated their appearance? 
Finally, historians have concluded that the Papers had little impact on 
the ratification decision even in New York.367 It is difficult, if not 
incoherent, to view Publius’s work as legislative history when “[t]here 
is no good evidence that anyone, even in New York, relied on The 
Federalist as the basis for voting to ratify.”368
for viewing constitutional history with more skepticism than legislative history. See, e.g., id. at 
1311 (noting that Congress might direct corrective legislation at judicial misreadings of statutes 
based on manipulations of legislative history, but cannot cure similar manipulations in the 
constitutional context; also worrying that reliance on constitutional history from the founding 
period ignores postratification amendments that profoundly altered key themes of the 
Constitution). But see id. at 1316–21 (suggesting a possible case for continued use of 
constitutional, but not legislative history: Exclusion of legislative history⎯but not constitutional 
history⎯may properly respond to modern-day interests groups’ strategic creation of legislative 
materials to facilitate later arguments to judges, which in turn distorts the deliberative 
lawmaking process). 
 363. See SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38 (stating that the “original meaning of the text” is 
paramount, not “what the original draftsmen intended”). 
 364. See DE PAUW, supra note 17, at 111 n.25 (finding no record of publication in seven of 
the states and that “no more than twelve” of the essays appeared in newspapers outside of 
Boston and Philadelphia). 
 365. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1309 (noting that “[n]o historian has rigorously 
established that the arguments [in The Federalist] were known and accepted in any other state, 
or even for that matter in New York”); Manning, supra note 349, at 1340 (finding no evidence 
that ratifiers agreed with the “intricate and often-lengthy essays”); id. at 1355 (questioning 
whether a “constitutionally sufficient number of ratifiers” were influenced by The Federalist, 
given the Papers’ limited circulation). 
 366. FURTWANGLER, supra note 251, at 19–21. 
 367. See McGowan, supra note 224, at 756 (noting overwhelming election of antifederalist 
delegates in New York and the key role of Virginia’s acceptance of the Constitution, rather than 
of The Federalist, in triggering New York’s ratification). 
 368. Id.; see also Ducayet, supra note 275, at 846 (noting these and additional problems with 
the legislative-history account). 
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These problems greatly complicate the case for citing The 
Federalist on a legislative-history theory. Perhaps the two greatest 
difficulties in doing so, however, spring from the argumentative 
character of the work. The first problem is that Hamilton, Madison, 
and Jay did not write or publish the essays in the context of 
lawmaking operations. Rather, in keeping with their overarching plan 
to present an argument to voters, they penned the tracts for 
publication as newspaper editorials. As others have observed, it is 
difficult to view materials written wholly outside the legislative 
process as legislative history.369
Second, even assuming the essays could surmount this hurdle, 
they may well not rank as the sort of legislative history that deserves 
significant respect. Courts have long recognized that different forms 
of legislative history merit different levels of judicial attention,370 and 
in applying this principle there is much reason not to give the The 
Federalist high legislative-history marks. For example, Hamilton and 
Madison’s project of persuasion led them to defend ideas with which 
they themselves disagreed.371 It seems odd to say that, even when 
documents are crafted so strategically that they do not reflect their 
own authors’ outlook, they can nonetheless qualify as an official 
expression of a body of lawgivers on whose behalf those authors 
somehow supposedly spoke. 
C. The Federalist as Dictionary 
As we have seen, Justice Scalia strongly rejects the use of 
legislative history in interpreting enacted materials.372 How, then, can 
 369. See Manning, supra note 349, at 1349 (noting that, because of the anonymity of the 
authors, state ratifiers “would have had no reason to believe that Madison, Hamilton, or Jay 
were authorized to speak for the Convention”); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1295, 1316 (1990) (emphasizing that the essayists lacked authorization to represent the 
views expressed at the Philadelphia Convention). 
 370. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the superior validity of committee reports above other 
forms of legislative history because they are generally “well considered and carefully 
prepared”). 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 248–50. 
 372. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
COENEN FINAL.DOC 11/28/2006  3:50 PM 
534 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:469 
 
he routinely cite The Federalist?373 Justice Scalia himself answered this 
question in a well-known commentary on the foundations of law: 
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention—Hamilton’s and 
Madison’s writings in The Federalist, for example. I do so, however, 
not because they were Framers and therefore their intent is 
authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their writings, 
like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, 
display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood. 
Thus I give equal weight to Jay’s pieces in The Federalist, and to 
Jefferson’s writings, even though neither of them was a Framer. 
What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a 
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original 
draftsmen intended.374
This approach seems to involve an “abstract, grammatical” use of 
the Papers.375 Because the enacted terms of the Constitution are 
central to determining “original meaning,” the key question becomes 
how those terms were viewed in the time and place of their adoption. 
Thus courts may consult The Federalist for much the same reason that 
they may consult “Samuel Johnson’s dictionary or any other usage 
guide.”376 The cited text⎯here, The Federalist⎯serves the sole 
purpose of shedding light on then-accepted understandings of the 
words and phrases that appear in the Constitution. 
This approach to The Federalist has encountered resistance,377 in 
part because it lends no special weight to the “character and 
achievements of Hamilton and Madison.”378 Justice Scalia’s account 
would seem to treat no differently than The Federalist a commentary 
on the Constitution crafted by a local blacksmith, so long as the 
blacksmith understood as well as Publius how the average ratification 
delegate would use the words that appear in the Constitution. It 
might even be that Justice Scalia would accord as much significance to 
the views of “intelligent and informed” antifederalist writers as he 
 373. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–15 (1997) (citing cautions in The 
Federalist against congressional imposition of duties upon states “without consent of the States,” 
id. at 911). 
 374. SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38. 
 375. McGowan, supra note 224, at 835. 
 376. Id. at 757. 
 377. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1312 (describing Justice Scalia’s approach as 
embodying “a weak justification for consulting The Federalist”). 
 378. McGowan, supra note 224, at 835. 
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would ascribe to the views of Publius. The writer Brutus, for example, 
detected in the words of the Constitution⎯particularly its vesting of 
equity jurisdiction in the Supreme Court⎯a broad grant of authority 
to the federal judiciary to safeguard unenumerated rights.379 If Brutus 
was bright and fully familiar with proper use of the English language 
in late-eighteenth-century America (as he surely was), does it not 
follow that we should assign his views on the meaning of the 
constitutional text as much significance as the views expressed in The 
Federalist? According to Justice Scalia’s methodology, it seems as 
though we should. 
One might say that judges should be leery of accepting Brutus’s 
treatment of the judicial power because he was writing in an effort to 
persuade readers to oppose the Constitution. But that is the point. By 
symmetry of logic, courts should hesitate to rely on the no-less-
advocacy-driven writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. Standard 
works by Blackstone or Coke might well serve a dictionary function 
by fleshing out generally understood meanings of legal terms 
employed in the Constitution. Such works, however, are a far cry 
from pseudonymously produced newspaper editorials.380 At the very 
least, Justice Scalia’s treatment of The Federalist suffers from a 
significant omission in that it offers no explanation as to why its 
adversarial argument fairly “display[s] how the text of the 
Constitution was originally understood.”381
D. The Federalist as Treatise 
As shown, there is reason to reject both the legislative-history 
and dictionary-like-aid approaches to judicial use of The Federalist. 
Some analysts have sought to fill the resulting gap by arguing that 
courts should consider Publius’s teachings in much the same way they 
consider scholarly treatises on law. According to this theory, courts 
should approach The Federalist like they approach books written by 
Joseph Story or James Kent, or perhaps even Laurence Tribe. As 
Professor McGowan notes, “[t]his is how the Court tended to use the 
 379. See Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 18, at 417, 419 (stating that the Constitution “vests the judicia[ry] with a power to 
resolve all questions that may arise on any case on the construction of the constitution”). 
 380. See Manning, supra note 349, at 1355–59 (cautioning against “equat[ing] the 
expressions of Publius with the understanding of the ratifiers”). 
 381. SCALIA, supra note 360, at 38. 
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essays in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it is the only 
form of reasoning the essays support very well.”382
This point of view raises foundational issues about the nature of 
constitutional interpretation. To begin with, what business do courts 
have relying on treatises in the first place? At least from an ardently 
originalist perspective, courts should eschew reliance on treatises, or 
at least most of them, because they typically tell more about the views 
of the treatise writer than about the views of the framers. Notably, the 
leading proponent of the learned-treatise approach seems to concede 
this point, acknowledging that treatise-based views of The Federalist 
“do not assert that the essays reveal what the drafters of the 
Constitution thought . . . , nor do they claim that the essays show what 
ordinary speakers of late-eighteenth century English thought the 
words of the Constitution meant.”383 Even if The Federalist qualifies 
as a learned treatise, this concession is significant because few 
judges⎯regardless of the interpretive principles they embrace⎯view 
treatises as having the level of interpretive clout normally associated 
with The Federalist Papers. The question thus remains of whether the 
learned-commentary approach to The Federalist gives the work its full 
and proper due. 
In any event, the key point developed earlier in this article rubs 
up hard against viewing The Federalist as a learned commentary. 
Common experience suggests, after all, that what makes “learned 
commentaries” learned is in large measure that the relevant writing 
reflects the work of a detached, objective, and non-self-interested 
scholar. The function of The Federalist as a tool of political debate 
makes it hard to view its authors in this light. Put simply, it is strained 
to justify reliance on The Federalist by characterizing it as a learned 
treatise when its authors wrote it not as a learned treatise but as self-
serving campaign literature. 
E. The Federalist as Brilliant Philosophy 
The preceding discussion focuses on originalist styles of 
constitutional interpretation. This is the case because that discussion 
primarily addresses the question whether The Federalist can qualify as 
a proper indicator of “original intent” or “original meaning” in light 
 382. McGowan, supra note 224, at 756. 
 383. Id. 
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of its demonstrably political-persuasion-based character.384 It is hardly 
surprising that a consideration of The Federalist’s role in 
constitutional interpretation should have an originalist focus. Publius, 
after all, wrote his essays during the very time period when original 
thinking about the Constitution occurred.385 Yet if there are serious 
problems with looking to The Federalist as legislative history or as an 
indicator of then-existing linguistic understandings, a surprising 
conclusion might follow—namely, that nonoriginalist, rather than 
originalist, styles of interpretation provide the firmest basis for 
judicial use of The Federalist. Charles Fried, for example, heads in the 
direction of this conclusion when he writes that the Papers warrant 
judicial attention because of their “intrinsic worth” and because they 
reflect “the thought of the wisest men who had occasion to think most 
deeply” about the Constitution.386
Observers other than Fried state even more clearly that The 
Federalist should count in constitutional interpretation not because it 
reflects the thinking of the Constitution’s ratifiers, but because it 
contains unusually wise insights offered by writers deserving of the 
highest respect.387 From this vantage point, relying on the writings of 
Abraham Lincoln (for example) would parallel judicial invocation of 
the writings of Publius. Why? Because Lincoln⎯like Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay⎯had the benefit of deep experience in the affairs 
of government, a brilliant understanding of human nature, and 
extraordinary practical wisdom. These qualities might not permit 
Lincoln to offer much information about the thinking of long-dead 
ratification delegates, but they would permit him to make invaluable 
observations on how government works best. In fact, the Supreme 
Court has cited Lincoln in defining the essential nature of the state-
 384. See Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1312–16 (discussing the difference between “original 
intent” and “original meaning” but further arguing that this difference is “questionable” and at 
best “a fine one”). 
 385. See McGowan, supra note 224, at 825–26 (noting that recent court cases tend to “cite 
The Federalist in connection with decisions based on the ‘original meaning’ or ‘original 
understanding’ of the Constitution”). 
 386. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 63 (1991). 
 387. See Ducayet, supra note 275, at 825 (suggesting that The Federalist “may serve as a 
useful form of constitutional authority by providing a particularly sophisticated theory of 
political psychology,” and adding that this “justification treats the work neither as evidence of 
the binding ‘intentions’ of the Framers nor as a dated and biased historical artifact, but rather as 
a rich lode of insights”); id. at 829–30, 833 (attributing a similar view of The Federalist to Joseph 
Story and, at least in part, to historian Charles Beard). 
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federal relationship.388 Likewise⎯so the argument goes⎯the Court 
should be free to cite the no less timeless and insightful work of 
Publius. 
There are at least three difficulties with citing The Federalist on 
the theory that it embodies wise discourse. First, given the 
argumentative character of The Federalist, its pages may well not 
embody the most trustworthy⎯as opposed to the most polemically 
appealing⎯account of the matters the essays address. Writings that 
attribute “political fanaticism”389 and “distempered imaginations”390 to 
one’s opponents, for example, do not have the same ring as The 
Gettysburg Address. Second, nonoriginalist styles of interpretation 
(or at least some of them) are controversial. In particular, concerns 
about illegitimacy and indeterminacy would lead many scholars to 
bemoan an interpretive principle that read something like this: 
“Courts should interpret the Constitution to mean whatever would 
cause it to work best in the view of the wisest people.” Yet, the 
nonoriginalist argument for invoking The Federalist seems to hinge on 
this very notion. 
Finally, even assuming that a sound nonoriginalist case for using 
The Federalist exists, few would argue that a nonoriginalist 
justification would possess as solid a grounding in accepted 
interpretive traditions as a strong originalist justification.391 Put 
another way, The Federalist will carry more interpretive heft if both 
an originalist theory and a nonoriginalist theory for its invocation are 
available. I return, then, to the question whether The Federalist can 
properly serve as a reasonable proxy for the intentions and meaning 
of those who ratified the Constitution. 
 388. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (citing the Gettysburg 
Address for the proposition that “[o]urs is a ‘government of the people, by the people, for the 
people’”). 
 389. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 185. 
 390. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 14, at 49–50. 
 391. But cf. Ducayet, supra note 275, at 847–48 (questioning originalist methodologies in 
evaluating The Federalist’s proper role in constitutional interpretation). It is outside the 
purposes of this Article to explore the comparative merits of originalist and nonoriginalist 
methods of interpretation. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the Supreme Court has 
long considered references to the framers’ intentions as among the important methods of 
constitutional interpretation. 
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F. The Federalist as Consensus Understanding 
Commentators have offered a rich mix of theories for judicial use 
of The Federalist. Yet all of the theories considered so far suffer from 
serious shortcomings, or at least from incompleteness. How can it be, 
especially from an originalist perspective, that a self-serving set of 
campaign tracts should factor into the process of constitutional 
interpretation? 
Answering this question requires circling back to the original 
purpose of The Federalist. As shown, that purpose was to set forth an 
argument. What is important, however, is that that argument was of a 
particular kind, for the authors rooted their case for persuasion in a 
meticulous appeal to reason.392 To be sure, bombast and braggadocio 
made their way into the essays, and Publius appealed to visceral 
concerns and emotional reactions along the way.393 At its core, 
however, The Federalist set forth a relentlessly cohesive and logical 
argument built on lessons of experience, accepted principles of 
human conduct, and deductions drawn from widely accepted 
premises.394
The decision of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to focus on 
reasoned argument carried with it a consequence of great significance 
to present-day students of constitutional meaning. Precisely because 
Publius’s purpose was to gain support from a broad and diverse 
audience with arguments based on reason, the views set forth in the 
Papers could be neither sloppy nor personal nor idiosyncratic. 
Rather, Publius’s depiction of the Constitution had to reflect a 
broadly acceptable view of the document’s meaning. And because 
that depiction had to reflect a broadly acceptable view, it seems fair to 
conclude that it articulated something that approximated a consensus 
understanding.395 It is this reason—coupled with the authors’ genius 
and their inside knowledge of the Convention’s thinking⎯that lends 
The Federalist a powerful claim to interpretive significance. The 
 392. See, e.g., supra note 310 (discussing development of this theme by Professor 
Furtwangler). 
 393. See supra Part II.F. 
 394. See supra Part II.A.–II.E. 
 395. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 22 (1993) 
(noting that The Federalist presented “in aggregate the outer bounds as well as the central 
substance of what their authors conceived was the claim they could make⎯the object being 
above all persuasion⎯on their readers’ experience, aspirations, and habits of thought”); see also 
Ducayet, supra note 275, at 822 (noting that The Federalist “was designed to place the 
Constitution in the most desirable light possible”). 
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authors’ genius plays a role because it suggests that they would and 
did succeed in the task they undertook⎯namely, to construct the best 
possible reason-based argument for ratification that, in turn, would 
best speak to a wide and diverse audience. The authors’ inside 
knowledge facilitated this effort by providing valuable insights about 
how the provisions of the Constitution might be elaborated in the 
most sensible, coherent and appealing fashion.396 And if The 
Federalist in fact sets forth something like a consensus view, it cannot 
help but shed light on the all-important question of what “We the 
People” meant to say in the words of the Constitution.397
In sum, as William Eskridge explains, there are “[c]onventions 
that make it reasonable to suppose that certain focal speakers reflect 
more than their own views when they make statements in the course 
of public constitutional . . . debates.”398 Even more important, there 
are powerful reasons to conclude that those conventions apply with 
added force to the writings of Publius.399
G. The Consensus-Understanding View and Other Theories 
At the very least, these observations may help to strengthen 
other theories that support judicial reliance on The Federalist. To the 
extent that the essays qualify as legislative history, for example, it 
lends them weight to say that they embodied mainstream viewpoints 
that an ordinary ratifier would likely share. In similar fashion, to the 
 396. It might be said in response that The Federalist reflected at most a likely consensus of 
only those pro-Constitution voters in New York. In particular, this argument gains support—at 
least on a superficial level⎯from the fact that Publius laced his case for ratification with appeals 
that focused on the local interests of New York. See supra text accompanying notes 95–104, 
177–87. It seems apparent, however, that the special treatment of New York voters had more to 
do with the examples used in the essays to illustrate the Constitution’s effects than with any 
effort to define the terms and purposes of the Constitution in light of New York’s special needs. 
One significant fact confirms this non-single-state view of the argument made in the essays; 
upon their completion, Madison had them carted off to Virginia, where he used them 
extensively in arguing for ratification at the convention of his own southern, agrarian, slave-
holding state. See KETCHAM, supra note 2, at 258, 261–62 (noting that The Federalist provided 
the source of many arguments Madison made at Virginia’s ratification convention); see also 
Ducayet, supra note 275, at 822 (noting that the essays “were hastily published in book form so 
that they could be distributed to partisans in other states”). 
 397. See RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 15 (noting that The Federalist Papers are “[f]oremost” 
among contemporary sources reflecting the original understanding of the Constitution). 
 398. Eskridge, supra note 349, at 1313. 
 399. See id. at 1318 (“[P]ublic dialogue of the sort engaged in by the authors of The 
Federalist and the Anti-Federalists is potentially quite reliable for figuring out original 
constitutional understanding or meaning.”). 
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extent that the essays might give dictionary-like guidance to the 
meaning of constitutional words, it helps the case for judicial use that 
their authors prepared them with a strong sensitivity to the mind of 
the general public, rather than out of mere whim or highly specialized 
purposes. This same point may also help to show why the writings of 
Publius should count for more than the antifederalist writings of 
commentators such as Brutus. Brutus, after all, had every reason to 
portray the document’s terms in their most extreme and controversial 
light because he was seeking to drive voters away from ratification. 
Against this backdrop, when ratifiers adopted the Constitution, it 
seems unlikely they said in effect: “We believe that the Constitution 
embodies the troubling interpretations put forward by Brutus, rather 
than the more moderate interpretations put forward by Publius, but 
we are going to ratify anyway.” More likely, they ratified because 
they shared something like the consensus-seeking vision, designed to 
induce the very action they took, put forward in The Federalist.400
The consensus-oriented nature of The Federalist may also bolster 
its cite-ability on the theory that it is a learned legal treatise or a wise 
statement of the principles of sound government. For example, 
although it strains common usage to place campaign literature in the 
“learned treatise” or “fount of wisdom” pigeonholes, as a general 
matter, the effort seems less farfetched when one recalls that this 
particular body of campaign material was studiously designed to 
appeal to human reason. The “sustained, systematic” character of The 
Federalist401 strengthens this suggestion. Hornbook law teaches, for 
example, that judges must take care to read the provisions of a legal 
text in light of one another.402 Publius’s effort at comprehensiveness 
ensured that⎯in treatise-like fashion⎯The Federalist took fair 
account of this principle. 
It is not surprising that thoughtful observers often point to the 
argumentative nature of The Federalist in suggesting that it should 
play little role in constitutional interpretation. On close examination, 
however, the argumentative nature of the essays helps explain why 
 400. See id. at 1318 (noting that “key players . . . have incentives to represent the commonly 
held views as faithfully as they can, lest they lose parts of the coalition” while opponents’ 
“strategic statements are worth little in understanding the provision if it is adopted, because 
their incentives are to exaggerate and distort the meaning and effect of the provision”). 
 401. Rakove, supra note 3, at 234. 
 402. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
47.02, at 139 (5th ed. 1992) (describing “whole act” rule). 
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they carry interpretive force. Because Publius sought to appeal to a 
broad and diverse audience with methodical arguments rooted in 
reason, The Federalist is fairly seen as embodying something like a 
then-consensus understanding of the Constitution’s meaning. To be 
sure, The Federalist does not qualify as “holy writ,”403 and this is all 
the more the case because of its campaign-rhetoric roots.404 As a 
result, courts must handle the essays with no less, and perhaps more, 
care than other tools of interpretation. At the same time, The 
Federalist must be given its due. Over the past two centuries, the 
Court has struck this balance in a sensible fashion, refusing to view 
the essays as an “authoritative exposition of constitutional 
meaning”405 but according them “great respect in expounding the 
constitution.”406
CONCLUSION 
The authors of The Federalist set forth an argument that was 
layered and complex. They made sure to appeal to the special 
interests of their New York readers. To a phalanx of arguments 
founded on history and common sense they added color and imagery 
designed to bolster their appeals to logical reasoning. Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay urged their readers to recognize the wisdom of 
practical accommodation. They appealed to pathos and ethos as well, 
particularly by aligning the cause of ratification with America’s 
celebrated revolutionary heritage. 
What may be gleaned from the authors’ nuanced interweaving of 
these different strands of argument? To begin with, the account 
offered here removes any doubt about the centrality of strategic and 
politically motivated argument to the plan of Publius. This intensely 
partisan purpose in turn provides good reason not to accept blindly 
the essays as a determinative statement of the Constitution’s purposes 
and meaning. At the same time, the argumentative tenor of The 
Federalist does not strip it of significance as a source of constitutional 
exegesis. Indeed, the persuasion-driven character of The 
 403. Tillman, supra note 218, at 617. 
 404. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 349, at 1358 (noting that, while “the room for strategic 
maneuvering might have been circumscribed by the need to make plausible arguments,” 
nonetheless “[w]ithin that range . . . the exposition of particular understandings or provisions 
might well reflect the shadings of political strategy”). 
 405. Id. at 1365. 
 406. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819). 
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Federalist⎯founded on comprehensive arguments directed at a broad 
audience and rooted firmly in reason⎯tends to support the view that 
the writings of Publius approximated a widely shared, then-existing, 
coherent understanding of the Constitution. 
Whatever one concludes about these matters, one thing is 
certain. The intensely political purposes of The Federalist’s authors 
brought about the enduring impact of their work. It was the ardor and 
enthusiasm that the authors brought to their task, after all, that 
generated the clarity, comprehensiveness, and overarching quality 
that have ensured the Papers’ persisting fame. To be sure, Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay focused their energies on pushing the case for 
ratification among citizens of their own time and place. They did so, 
however, with the all-out effort of single-minded advocates bent on 
promoting a cause they viewed as transcendently important. It was 
this drive to persuade, fueled by passionate commitment, that 
produced what may well be—as Thomas Jefferson put it—“the best 
commentary on the principles of government which ever was 
written.”407
 407. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC 
OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 
1776–1826, at 566, 567 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). 
